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I.
THE use by tenants of bankruptcy and receivership to avoid leases
has been in great vogue during the last few years. Iost conspic-
uous has been their use by chain stores, the vast majority of whose
store locations are leased, not owned.' But other tenants have
likewise resorted to these devices to reduce overhead, until the whole
procedure has been frequently condemned in popular thought as
constituting nothing but a racket which ingenious counsel have
devised as an avenue of escape from just obligations.
Abuses there undoubtedly have been. Yet back of many of these
bankruptcies and receiverships is the grim economic necessity of
reducing overhead. Certainly when the rent item soars to 255
of gross revenue (as has been true of some chain stores) insolvency
becomes imminent. Falling prices and declining sales make neces-
sary and in fact dictate a readjustment if the business is to continue
as a going concern. Private negotiations failing, resort is had to
other methods.
It has been commonly assumed among lawyers that bankruptcy
-and to a lesser extent equity receivership-afforded the proper
relief to tenants. With meticulous care the lawyers for the tenant
saw to it that the rent was paid in advance just prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. Accordingly it was concluded that
at the time of the filing of the petition there was no provable claim.
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Provability of claims in bankruptcy is governed by statute.2 And
it had been held that the statute required the claim to be absolutely
owing, though not necessarily liquidated, at the date of the filing
of the petition.3 Accordingly, though the lessor might have a claim
for rent or damages, such claim would arise after the filing of the
petition and hence be not provable.4 And, though the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation would give a seller of personalty a provable
claim against the estate of the bankrupt buyer,5 that doctrine (it
was assumed) would not be applicable to a lease of realty. Leases
of realty, it was said,6 were somewhat sui generis, different from
2. Bankruptcy Act § 63 (a) provides: "Debts of the bankrupt may be
proved and allowed against his estate which are (1) a fixed liability, as
evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at
the time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or
not . . .; (4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express or
implied;
3. Perhaps the leading case giving this interpretation to § 63 is In ro Roth
& Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910). For a recent review of the
authorities see Schwabacker & Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptoy (1933)
33 COL. L. Rv. 213. And see Schmitt, Rights of the Landlord (1933) 5
Miss. L. J. 147.
4. In re Roth & Appel, supra note 3; Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410
(C. C. A. 1st, 1910). Contra: In re Caloris Mfg. Co., 179 Fed. 722 (E. D.
Pa. 1910); In re Schechter, 39 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930).
5. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U. S. 581 (1916).
6. The Supreme Court in Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, supra
note 5, took pains to point out the distinction between contracts respecting
personalty and those involving the landlord tenant relationship. It said,
at 590, "Cases of the latter class are distinguishable, because of the diversity
between duties which touch realty, and the personalty," quoting Co. LITT.
*292b, § 513. And as stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Gardiner v. Butler, 245
U. S. 603, 605 (1918): ". . . the law as to leases is not a matter of logic
in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke." Coke in
the passage quoted was not speaking of anticipatory repudiation. In fact the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation may be said to date from Hochster v. Do
la Tour, 2 E & B 678 (1853). Coke was speaking of releases which he said
". . . shall not barre the lessor of his rent, because it was neither dobitum
nor solvendum at the time of the release made; for if the land be evicted from
the lessee before the rent became due, the rent is avoyded; for it is to be
paid out of the profits of the land, and it is a thing not meerely in action,
because it may be granted over." Space does not permit an elaboration
of the theme that this conception of rent, though genuinely anachronistic when
applied to leases of present day office buildings, was in many ways the essence
of realism even before Coke's time. Several observations, however, may be
made. (1) The law of leaseholds was developed on their modern basis In
the agricultural economy of England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Down to the date of the industrial revolution agriculture was the most im-
portant form of industry. Hence "it is not surprising that the forms of other
leases, such as building and mining leases, were not settled till the nineteenth
century." 7 HOLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 241-242. (2)
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bilateral contracts to which was applicable the doctrine of antici-patory repudiation by virtue of adjudication in bankruptcy, sincethey were founded on ancient rules of property law with roots infeudal England Even in the presence of express covenants in thelease calling for payment of damages in the event of the lessee'sbankruptcy, it was said that the claim was rarely provable. It wasbarred because, among other reasons, whether or not the lessor would
stand on the lease, or reenter and terminate it, or elect to claim
The obligation of the land as expressed in the procedural device of distraintis well described by Maitland, "Into the land the rent owner enters; he tahesthe chattels that are found there; they may or may not be the chattels of thetenant; they are on the burdened land and that is enough. In such a case itis easy for us to picture the rent 'issuing out of' the land and encumbering theland." 2 PoiavocK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (2d ed. 1905) 1U0.(3) In case of rent in fee the land was not only the principal debtor but theonly debtor. The landlord could sue for his rent by real actions. He would
claim rent as he would claim an estate in land. 7 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. at 263;2 POLLocK & MfAT.AwD, op. cit. at 131-32. Thus it was that the basis ofrelationship between landlord and tenant was tenure and privity of estate,
classified in the law of property not contracts. (4) In fact, though the actionof debt lay for rent reserved on a lease for years (Co. Lrrr. *201 b) still thelandlord here also had the right of distraint. 7 HOLDswOrrr, op. cit. at 268et seq. And as Holdsworth says, ". . . the writ of debt was as muchproprietary as contractual." 7 Holdsworth, op. cit. at 265.The fact is that the law of landlord and tenant went through a profounddevelopment at a time when the law of contract was only nascent and the lawof property dominant. It is but natural that its roots should be found in thelatter. Yet this history should not bar courts from treating leases more realis-tically today. To assimilate leases of modern office buildings to feudal tenurein seventeenth century England is to disregard the essential elements of thebargain made, the present money economy, and the great development in con-tract law which has taken place since Coke wrote. This change in the entireperspective is evidenced by the decided trend in the last ten years to extendthe doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to leases and to treat them as bilateral
contracts for that purpose. See the cases infra note 117.7. The lower federal courts in reliance upon the distinction made by theSupreme Court have uniformly held that a landlord has no claim provable inbankruptcy based upon anticipatory breach providcd, hooevor, that the commonlaw obtains in the state whose law governs the lease. This has been held asto Ohio leases. Wells v. Twenty-First St. Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A.6th, 1926); In re McAllister-MohIer Co., 46 F. (2d) 91 (S. D. Ohio 1930).Contra: In re Bissinger, 5 F. (2d) 106 (N. D. Ohio 1925). The rule has alsobeen applied to Massachusetts leases. In re Service Appliance Co., Inc., 39 F.(2d) 632 (N. D. N. Y. 1930). And to Kansas leases. Watson v. Merrill, 136Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905). For cases applying the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation to leases see note 117, infra. Since Central Trust Co. v. ChicagoAuditorium, supra note 5, and Wilson v. National Refining Co., 126 Kan 139,266 Pac. 941 (1928) (extending the doctrine of anticipatory breach to leases),the case of Watson v. Merrill, supra, can no longer be said to represent
bankruptcy law in Kansas.
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damages under the covenant, was uncertain at the date of the filing
of the petition." Hence, unless the covenant to pay damages was
strictly a conditional limitation 9 (and this is rare in modern leases),
the claim was not provable in bankruptcy; and even if it were, 
the
claim might not be.'10
Provability in an equity (insolvency) receivership was deemed to
be easier since there were no statutory restrictions." The claim
need not be absolutely owing at the time of the appointment 
of
the receiver.' 2  It was provable so long as it matured within 
the
time fixed by the chancellor for filing of claims.'
8 Hence even rent
maturing after the appointment of the receiver might be provable.
14
And a claim for damages founded upon an express covenant 
was
thus provable, provided the damages were liquidated in a manner
"familiar and fair." '5 But in absence of an express covenant to 
pay
damages, there was no provable claim provided no default in pay-
ment of rent or in the performance of other covenants in the lease
occurred prior to the end of the period for filing claims. Here 
as
in the case of bankruptcy the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation 
'
0
was said to have no place.17 Hence the payment of rent and
meticulous performance of all other covenants in the lease during
the period when claims could be filed were often thought to 
be
8. In re Roth & Appel, supra note 3; Slocum v. Soliday, 
supra note 4.
9. See, for example, the clause construed as a conditional 
limitation in R. C.
Taylor Trust v. Kothe, 30 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929), vov'd on other grounds,
Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224 (1930). And see Slocum v. Soliday,
supra note 4.
10. In re Wise Shoes, Inc., 2 Fed. Supp. 521 (S. D. N. Y. 
1932), where
the breach occurred before the filing of the petition but the 
liquidation of the
claim could not be had under New York law until the end 
of the term. See
discussion infra, pp. 1044 
et seq.
11. Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 (1918).
12. Ibid.
13. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 
Fed. 721 (C. C. A.
2d, 1912).
14. Chicago Fire Place Co. v. Tait, 58 Ill. App. 293 (1895); Rogers 
v.
United Grape Products, Inc., 2 Fed. Supp. 70 (W. D. N. Y. 1933).
15. Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, supra note 11; Gardiner 
v. Butler,
supra note 6; International Paper Co. v. Priscilla Co., 183 N. 
E. 58 (Mass.
1932); People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 
(1897);
McGraw v. Union Trust Co., 135 Mich. 609, 98 N. W. 390 (1904).
16. Napier v. Peoples Stores Co., 98 Conn. 414, 120 Atl. 295 
(1923) holding
that the appointment of a receiver for a buyer of personalty 
under a consent
decree constituted anticipatory repudiation.
17. See e.g. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. 
Co., supr note
13. Cf. Rogers v. United Grape Products, Inc., supra note 14. Contra: Leo
v. Pearce Stores, 54 F. (2d) 92 (E. D. Mich. 1931). And see cases infra
note 117.
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adequate safeguards to prevent the lessor from participating in
the receivership.
It is seriously doubted if the generality of all of those conclusions
can be sustained. But the reasons for this disagreement must be
reserved for another occasion.'8 Here it is important to note the
consequences attributed to this general assumption of the non-
provability of the landlord's claim. Since the claim was not provable
in bankruptcy, it was not discharged.' 0 Thus in cases of individuals
or partners, they would clearly be liable even though they had been
released from all their other debts.20 And since they could not be
discharged again until another six years,2' the landlord could pursue
them for satisfaction of his claim. And in case the resuscitated
corporate lessee resumed business its discharge would likewise pro-
vide it with no greater immunity. But in case of corporate lessees
the result of either bankruptcy or equity receivership is likely to be
dissolution. If the business is continued, it is most apt to be by a
new corporation which purchases the assets at a sale or pursuant
to a composition agreement in case of bankruptcy. Hence by the
time the landlord matures his claim and liquidates it, the assets of
the tenant are either in process of distribution or in the hands of
a new company which has purchased them under the protection
of the court. By such methods it has been attempted either to
bring landlords to terms so that new leases may be negotiated or to
cut off completely their claims for rent or damages against the
reorganized company.
That these methods could be so effectively used to discriminate
against this class of creditors was ground for vigorous protest.
18. The reasons for this disagreement are primarily two-fold: (1) There
has been a gross overstatement of the non-applicability of the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation to leases. The federal courts in this situation apply
local law. See cases cited supra note 7, and Leo. v. Pearce Stores, supra note 17.
If the law of the several states is examined, it will be observed that during the
last decade there has been a decided and pronounced trend by state courts to
extend the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to leases. Furthermore the
rule pronounced by Williston that there could be no anticipatory repudiation of
a contract containing mutually independent covenants [WILLISTO:, CoNTRAcs
(1920) § 1329] has not been adopted by the Restatement. See CoNTTwCTs
RESTATEA=T (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 318. And see note 6, szpra. (2) Th
reasoning and language of the Supreme Court in Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S.
273 (1931) is directly contrary to the reasoning of the court in In re Roth
& Appel, supra note 3, in the interpretation to be given to § 63 (a) (1) and
§ 63 (a) (4) of the Bankruptcy Act.
19. Bankruptcy Act § 17.
20. In re Goldberg, 52 F. (2d) 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
21. Bankruptcy Act § 14 (b) (5). As to compositions cf. In re Goldberg,
53 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
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There was more than indignation. It was argued that no adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy or appointment of a receiver should be made
when the end sought was the elimination of the landlord. Ad-
judications in bankruptcy at the request or with the consent of
tenants and consent decrees in receivership were denounced. The
now almost classic case of May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. F. & W. Grand
5-10-25 Cent Stores, Ine.22 is illustrative of judicial indigation at its
height. Judge Bourquin not only denied the petition for an ancillary
receivership but also fined local counsel for the petitioner for con-
tempt. The opinion, assailing the inequity of converting the "temple
of justice" into a "place of injustice," decried the ". . . employment
of the judicial club to beat off and hold up creditors until, wearied,
they settle with or wait the pleasure of the debtor's executive vice-
president receiver shielded by the judicial gown." 23 The issue in the
case was much broader than the mere use of receivership to avoid
leases; the court was dealing with the larger problem of consent de-
crees. 24 It is not to be denied that abuses in the system exist and
explosions like that of Judge Bourquin may aid in eliminating them.
But the fact remains that businesses need some expeditious method
of financial rehabilitation. At heart the problem is a business and
economic one. As indicated above, grim economic necessity requires
that rent not exceed a certain percentage of gross revenue; in periods
of falling prices, declining sales and deep economic depression,
financial readjustment is a prime necessity.25 Equity receivership
and bankruptcy are most readily adapted to that end. To protect
creditors 26 (and even stockholders) in the process of reorganization
seems a more effective method of control than to deny resort to
these reorganization devices.
If the general assumption is made that the landlord can be made
to whistle for his rent or damages in the graveyards of dissolved
corporate lessees, the attitude of Judge Bourquin is all the more
understandable. If the law is that bankruptcy and receivership
may be employed to exterminate the lessor, then appointments of
receivers and adjudications in bankruptcy should be guarded jealous-
ly. Only when in extremis should a corporation be permitted to
22. 59 F. (2d) 218 (D. Mont. 1932).
23. Id., at 220.
24. The recent amendments of the Bankruptcy Act, adding § 77 which
provides for reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, make
friendly receiverships no longer necessary as respects such railroads.
25. See the critical account in Stevens, The Real Estate Bond Problem,
BULLETIN N. Y. STATE SocmrY OF CERTIFIED PuBLIo ACCOUNTANTS, July,
1932, at 3.
26. See Wham, Consent Receiverships in the Federal Court (1933) 19
A. B. A. J. 7.
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take a step so fatal to that class of creditors. But it is submitted
that the principles of reorganization law give the landlord protec-
tion to the same extent as other creditors, whenever stockholders
participate in a reorganization. The assumption that he can be
effectively barred through reorganization plans by mere failure to
provide for him cannot be sustained. If the reorganization mana-
gers do not extend to him the same protection as is extended to
other creditors, they proceed at the risk of the new corporation
being liable to the landlord as, if and when his claim matures and
becomes liquidated. This result is obvious if the landlord has a
claim which is provable in bankruptcy2 T or receivership. It is
equally true though the landlord has no claim satisfying the standard
tests of provability, for he is entitled to participation under such
reorganization plan despite the fact that at the time of the con-
summation of the plan by a sale of the assets to a new company his
claim is wholly contingent.
II.
This result follows from the general equitable principles enunciated
in the Boyd case 28 and applied to a number of analagous situations
in a long line of prior and subsequent decisions in the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts. Boyd was a creditor of the old Coeur
27. The recent amendments of the Bankruptcy Act make some changes in
the rules of provability for claims of landlords. § 74 provides for compositions
and extensions by "any person excepting a corporation". § 74 (a) provides:
"The term 'creditor' shall include for the purposes of an extension proposal
under this section all holders of claims of whatever character against the
debtor or his property including a claim for future rent, whether or not such
claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this act. A claim
for future rent shall constitute a provable debt and shall be liquidated under
section 63 (b) of this act." Although the new section is worded ambiguously
and is susceptible of several interpretations the following observations may
be made: (1) The position of the landlord in corporate reorganizations is left
untouched (a) since § 74 expressly excludes corporations and (b) since the
sentence last quoted probably means that a "claim for future rent" is provable
merely in a proceeding under § 74. (2) Provability of claims of landlords in
compositions is probably permitted under the sentence last quoted above. The
preceding sentence merely defines "creditor" under an extension. So, while a
landlord by negative implication might be held not to be a creditor in a
composition it would seem he would have a provable claim. Whether or not §
74 repeals in toto or partially the former composition sections is by no means
clear. But it should be noted that § 73 purports to give additional jurisdiction
only under § 74. The change in public policy which Congress indicates in
these amendments might well be used by the courts as an analogy in equity
receiverships. See Wyzanski, The Effect of the 1933 Baiilruptct Legislation
Upon the Rights of a Landlord (1933) J. NAT. Ass'N. REF. B'H'PTCY. 107.
28. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
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D'Alene Railroad and Navigation Company. While his suit (which
was brought by one Spaulding but title to which was later adjudged
to be in Boyd) was pending, the Coeur D'Alene leased its property
for 999 years to the Northern Pacific Railioad Company. The
Railroad Company acquired the stock of the Coeur D'Alene paying
for part of it out of the proceeds of bonds of the Coeur D'Alene
issued pursuant to previous resolutions of the Coeur D'Alene stock-
holders and guaranteed by the Railroad Company, This transaction
rendered the Coeur D'Alene insolvent.
'Several years later, while Boyd was still engaged in perfecting his
judgment against the Coeur D'Alene, receivers were appointed for the
Railroad Company pursuant to a creditors' bill; the various mort-
gages were foreclosed (including those of the Coeur D'Alene) ; and
subsequently the creditors' bill and the foreclosure actions were
consolidated and the receivership continued under the consolidated
causes. A reorganization plan was promulgated giving stockholders
of the Railroad Company stock in a new company, to be formed, on
payment of an assessment. Preferred stockholders of the old
company were assessed $10 and common stockholders $15, for each
old share of $100. No provision was made in the plan for unsecured
creditors of the old company. The bondholders of the old company
received new bonds.
The court ordered the property to be sold under the reorganiza-
tion plan. Notice by publication was made, pursuant to court order re-
quiring all creditors to present their claims within a specified time
on penalty of exclusion. At this stage one Paton and other unsecured
creditors filed a bill alleging that the sale was the result of a
conspiracy between bondholders and stockholders to exclude general
creditors and that stockholders should not be allowed to participate
until participation was first offered to creditors. The bill asked that
the decree of foreclosure be opened; that the court formulate a fair
plan; and that the sale be enjoined. The court denied the petition
concluding that there was no reason why the old stockholders should
not become stockholders in the new company since there was no equity
in the property out of which creditors could be paid. No appeal was
taken. Subsequently a sale of all the property was made pursuant to
the plan at a price of $86,000,000 less than the secured debts. The
court confirmed the sale. The purchaser was the Northern Pacific
Railway Company.
Ten years after the sale had been confirmed (and about twenty
years after the suit ending in Boyd's judgment had been started)
Boyd finally perfected his judgment against the Coeur D'Alene.
There being no property of the Coeur D'Alene on which execution
could be levied, Boyd brought a bill in equity against the Northern
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Pacific Railroad Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Com-
pany. His theory of the liability of the Railroad Company was
that it had become liable to creditors of the Coeur D'Alene by reason
of the diversion of the proceeds of the Coeur D'Alene bonds which
had been used to purchase part of the stock of the Coeur D'Alene.
The Supreme Court sustained him in this contention. Being in
legal effect a creditor .of the Railroad Company, he claimed that
the property of the old company in the hands of the new Railway
company was subject to the payment of his debt. The Supreme
Court held that the judicial sale pursuant to that reorganization
plan constituted fraud in law against Boyd and affinmed a decree
making his claim a lien upon the property of the Railroad company
in the hands of the Railway company but subject to the mortgages
placed thereon at the time of reorganization.
The salient points in the holding are as follows:
(1) A judicial sale made in good faith does not necessarily protect
the purchaser. As against the non-assenting creditor, a sale to a
new corporation in which the old stockholders receive stock is void
"regardless of the motive -with which it was made," the jiedieial
sale, although entirely free from fraud, being 2zo more efficacions
than a private contract between bondholders and stockholders. The
court said, "There is no difference in principle if the contract of
reorganization, instead of being effectuated by private sale, is con-
sunmated by a master's deed under a consent decree." -
(2) When stockholders participate in a reorganization plan without
making provision for creditors, they are "in the position of a mort-
gagor buying at his own sale." Though the purchase was made "in
good faith and in ignorance" of the creditor's claim, "they are none
the less bound to recognize his superior right in the property, when,
years later, his contingent claim was liquidated and established.!'Z
(3) The value of the property is immaterial in determining the
validity or invalidity of the sale, when stockholders of the old
company participate in securities of the new company formed pur-
suant to the reorganization receivership sale. The court said, "The
invalidity of the sale flowed from the character of the reorganiza-
tion agreement regardless of the value of the property, for in cases
like this, the question must be decided according to a fixed prin-
ciple, not leaving the rights of the creditors to depend upon the
balancing of evidence as to whether, on the day of sale, the property
was insufficient to pay prior encumbrances." 31
29. Id-, at 502 (italics supplied).
30. Id., at 504.
31. Id., at 507.
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(4) An unsecured creditor need not be paid "in cash as a condition
of stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized company." 8,
His interest can be preserved by the issuance to him of new securities.
He is entitled, however, to a "fair offer."
(5) In case no "fair offer" is made, the creditor "retains the right
to subject the interest of the old stockholders in the property to the
payment of his debt. If their interest is valueless, he gets nothing.
If it be valuable, he merely subjects that which the law had originally
and continuously made liable for the payment of corporate liabilities."
In determining the value of the interest of the stockholders in the
old company no definite rule is laid down. But the court said, "If
the value of the road justified the issuance of stock in exchange for
old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of that value,
whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for
purposes of control." 33
(6) The Paton suit was not res adjudicata as to Boyd, since he
was not a party to the record.
As has been noted elsewhere,3 4 the result of the Boyd case was
clearly foreshadowed in two earlier Supreme Court cases-the
Howard case 35 in 1869 and the Monon case 80 in 1899. And as
one of the writers has elsewhere indicated,87 the doctrine of
the Boyd case, so far as it permits the non-assenting creditor to
reach the interest of the stockholders in the old company, is nothing
more than an adaptation of the familiar rule of fraudulent con-
veyances originally expressed in the statute of 13 EmIZABlEIu. The
heart of the decision is in the following statement of the court:
"For, if purposely or unintentionally a single creditor was not paid, or
provided for in the reorganization, he could assert his superior rights
against the subordinate interests of the old stockholders in the property
transferred to the new company. They were in the position of insolvent
debtors who could not reserve an interest as against creditors. Their
original contribution to the capital stock was subject to the payment of
debts. The property was a trust fund charged primarily with the payment
of corporate liabilities. Any device, whether by private contract or
judicial sale under consent decree, whereby stockholders were preferred
32. Id., at 508.
33. Ibid.
34. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor.-
ganization (1933) 19 VA. L. Ruv. 541. See Swaine, Reorganization of Cor-
porations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade (1927) 27 Col.. L.
Rnv. 901.
35. Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392 (U. S. 1869).
36. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
37. Frank, supra note 34; cf. GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANC ES (1931) 300-302.
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before the creditor was invalid. Being bound for the debts, the purchase
of their property, by their new company, for their benefit, put the stock-
holders in the position of a mortgagor buying at his own sale. If they
did so in good faith and in ignorance of Boyd's claim, they were none the
less bound to recognize his superior right in the property, when years
later his contingent claim was liquidated and established. 3 -
Subsequent decisions 39 have somewhat amplified but have never
altered this rule of the Boyd ease. It is now clear that it is not a
rule peculiar to railroad reorganization, but applicable as well to
reorganizations of public utility and industrial corporations.40
Furthermore, the rule is not peculiar to equity receiverships. It
is clearly applicable to a sale in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus in
Kingston v. American Car & Foundry Co., 41 plaintiff sued for
specific performance of agreements alleged to have been made
between him and two other stockholders of a bankrupt corporation
to purchase certain assets of the corporation from the trustee in
bankruptcy at a small price and reorganize the corporation, dividing
the net profits among the three of them. It was alleged that the
assets of the corporation were worth $175,000, its debts were $150,000
and the assets were bought at the sale for $22,000. It was further
alleged that these two stockholders acquired the assets at public
sale and transferred them to defendant corporation and refused to
allow plaintiff his agreed participation. The lower court denied
relief on the ground that plaintiff had not sustained the burden of
proving the various agreements alleged. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in sustaining this finding, observed that in any event specific
performance would not lie, since the agreement would have been a
"fraud upon the creditors" of the bankrupt corporation in violation
of the principles of the Boyd case. Although this pronouncement
was by way of dictum only, it is nevertheless entitled to great weight.
38. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, supra note 28, at 504.
39. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New York,
271 U. S. 445 (1926) ; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 240
U. S. 166 (1916). For collection of cases see DOUGLAS & SHANKS, CASES &
MATERIALS ON REORGANIZATION (1931) 249-337. For discussions of this line
of cases see articles in SoMtE LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, RE-
ORGANIZATION & REGULATION (1931) 35-230; Swaine, supra note 34; Bonbright
& Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holdcr, in
a Corporate Reorganization (1928) 28 CoL. L. Rnv. 127; Frank, supra note 34.
40. See Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. United States Light & Heat
Co., 2 F. (2d) 384 (W. D. N. Y. 1924); Mountain States Power Co. v. Jordan
Lumber Co., 293 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), cert. den. 264 U. S. 582 (1923);
Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 Fed. 159 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
41. 55 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); cert. den. 285 U. S. 560 (1932).
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The court quoted as follows from the Kansas City Terminal Ry.
Co. case:
.. . any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate
rights and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at
the expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors comes withinjudicial denunciation.' Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville Railway Co., 174
U. S. 683, ,684, 19 S. Ct. 827, 43 L. Ed. 1130.
"This doctrine is the 'fixed principle' according to which Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. p. 507, 33 S. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931,
declares the character of reorganization agreements must be determined,
and to it there should be rigid adherence." 42
Any other rule would countenance a so-called fraudulent convey-
ance of the kind condemned in the Boyd case. It may be admitted
(though only for sake of argument) that Congress under its bank-
ruptcy power could provide a different rule. The fact remains that
it has not. Certainly a trustee's sale in bankruptcy is not more
sacred than the judicial sale in equity receivership. The judicial
sale in the Boyd case being void as to Boyd, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that the trustee's sale in bankruptcy would on the same facts
be equally void.
The composition section 43 of the Bankruptcy Act (at least before
its recent amendment) 44 provides for application for confirmation
of a composition after it has been accepted in writing "by a majority
in number of all creditors whose claims haVe been allowed, which
number must represent a majority in amount of such cfaims." The
judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied, inter alia, that "it Is
for the best interests of the creditors." Thus the property is re-
turned to the debtor on certain conditions. All statutory pre-
requisites having been satisfied, these creditors are bound to accept
their distributive share of the composition consideration. 45 But as
42. Id., at 136.
43. Bankruptcy Act § 12.
44. See note 27, supra.
45. In reorganizations in bankruptcy apart from the composition section
it has been held that the dissenting creditor must be given a cash alternative.
In re Prudential Outfitting Co. of Delaware, 250 Fed. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ;
In re J. B. & J. M. Cornell Co., 186 Fed. 859 (S. D. N. . 1911). And see
In re Northampton Portland Cement Co., 185 Fed. 542 (E. D. Pa.
1911). Quaere, as to the power of the bankruptcy court to confirm a com-
position under § 12 as against non-assenting creditors for whom no cash
alternative has been offered. As stated in Comment (1933) 42 YALn L. J.
387, 393. "Although the original composition clause required settlement in
'money,' and although the consideration in practice is generally cash or notes,
the language of the present composition provision is open to the interpretation
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will be shown, landlords are entitled in spite of this section to pro-
tection against a violation of the principles of the Boyd case. Thus
it is apparent that the doctrine of the Boyd case is not peculiar to
equity receiverships.
In the great majority of the cases the unsecured creditors who
have sought the protection of the Boyd case have had claims in
nowise contingent but absolutely owing at the time for filing of
claims. Yet there has been no decision limiting the application of
the Boyd case to that class of creditors. In fact Boyd was a creditor
with a claim contingent in one sense at the date of the sale in
July, 1896. It will be recalled that Boyd's claim was reduced to
judgment by Spaulding-an adverse claimant-in 1896. But this
judgment was against the Coeur D'Alene, 9zot against the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, the old corporation. While the judgment
was rendered against the Coeur D'Alene in 1896 it was not finally
affirmed until November 26, 1897 by the Supreme Court of IdahoA0
But even if it be assumed that the claim was sufficiently established
by 1896 to permit its being recognized as a matured but unliquidated
claim against the Coeur D'Alene, nevertheless it was far more than
unliquidated against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. As
against the latter it was strictly contingent in the sense that it took
the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether or not
as a matter of law the Railroad company was liable to Boyd because
of the diversion of assets from the Coeur D'Alene. Hence, if the
reorganization managers had decided to make provision in the plan
for Boyd, they could not know for certain at that time if Boyd's
claim against the Railroad company would ever be sustained. To
be sure they would know the maximum amount of the claim, except
for subsequently maturing interest. But the outcome of litigation
is never certain. Hence, looking at the claim as of the date of
1896 and earlier it was a possible but by no means certain liability
of the Railroad company. Doubtless for this reason the Supreme
Court referred to Boyd as the holder of a "contingent claim."
Certain it is that this protection afforded such a contingent creditor
is no anomaly in the law of fraudulent conveyances, for there is no
doubt that the statute 13 ELIZABETH 47 did not exclude subsequent
that long-term notes or even corporate securities may be offered as considera-
tion for a composition, and the meager court interpretations of this language
have not settled the issue to the contrary."
46. Spaulding v. Coeur D'Alene Ry. & Nay. Co., 5 Idaho 528, 51 Pac. 408
(1897).
47. 13 ELiz. c. 5. (1571).
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or contingent creditors from its protection.48 Such creditors might
be divided into four groups: First are those who have no claim
whatsoever at the date of the transfer complained of nor any
contract out of which a claim might arise.4 9 Second are those who
have a claim at the date of the alleged fraudulent conveyance, the
claim being, however, not matured, though perhaps certain in
amount.50 Third are those who have a claim at the date of the
conveyance complained of but who have not as yet liquidated it or
perhaps not even established the legal liability of the debtor for
it. 151 Fourth are those creditors who at the date of the alleged
fraudulent conveyance have a contract out of which a claim may
or may not arise. At the time in question no claim has arisen and
whether or not it will is dependent wholly on subsequent events.
The great weight of authority is that even this class of creditor
was protected against fraudulent conveyances of his debtor. As
stated by the Court of Appeals of New York, in a case to set aside
a fraudulent conveyance made by an agent who subsequently breached
his agency contract: "It has been repeatedly adjudged that a party
bound by a contract whereof he may become liable to the payment
of money, although his liability be contingent, is a debtor within
the meaning of the statute avoiding all grants made to hinder or
delay creditors." 52 Or as stated recently by the Supreme Court
of Florida, "Whoever has a legal claim or demand of a contractual
nature in existence at the time when an alleged fraudulent con-
veyance is made, is a 'creditor' within the meaning of the statute
against fraudulent conveyances. . . The holder of a contingent
48. GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) c. XVIII; (1915)
c. III, VIII. And see Thomson v. Crane, 73 Fed. 327 (D. Nov. 1896); Combs
v. Poulos, 241 Ky. 617, 44 S. W. (2d) 571 (1931); Friedel v. Wolfle, 41 Ohio
App. 561, 180 N. E. 738 (1931); Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §§ 1,
5, 6 and 7.
49. GLENN, op. cit. supra note 48, § 335 et seq.
50. Kautz v. Sheridan, 118 Me. 28, 105 Atl. 401 (1919); Hillsboro National
Bank v. Garbarino, 82 Ore. 405, 161 Pac. 703 (1916); GLENN, op. Cit. WuprM
note 48, § 326.
51. Burnwell Coal Co. v. Setzer, 203 Ala. 395, 83 So. 139 (1919); B1onson v.
Harriman, 55 Cal. App. 483, 204 Pac. 255 (1921); Griggs v. Crane's Trustee,
179 Ky. 48, 200 S. W. 317 (1918). Similarly for creditors under a wholly
executory contract. Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 131 Atl. 420 (1925).
And see Olwer v. Lewis, 149 Ga. 763, 102 S. E. 146 (1920).
52. Young v. Heermans, 66 N. Y. 374, 384 (1876). Thus a receiver of a
national bank has been granted the protection of the statute against fraud-
ulent conveyances where a stockholder made a conveyance after the appoint-
ment of the receiver but before the levy of an assessment. Duncan v. Freeman,
152 Ga. 332, 110 S. E. 5 (1921); Williams v. Travis, 277 Fed. 134 (C. C. A.
5th, 1922).
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claim is as fully protected by the statute as one that is absolute, and
in cases of contingent liability, the liability, whenever happening,
relates back to the date when it was originally incurred!' 53
Under this doctrine the landlord has been held to have the pro-
tection of 13 ELIZABETH against transfers by his tenant. Thus in
Woodbury v. Sparrell Print " the lessor brought a bill in equity to
reach and apply in payment of a debt property alleged to have been
fraudulently conveyed. The principal claim was for rent accruing
under a lease for years after the conveyance was 7nade. Defendants
demurred on the ground, inter alia, that the statute afforded no
protection to such claim. The court refused to sustain the demurrer
on that ground, saying, "But it is familiar law that a conveyance
fraudulent under the St. of 13 Eliz. c. 5, as against existing creditors
at the time of its delivery, also may be avoided by subsequent
creditors." 55
53. Weathersbee v. Dekle, 145 So. 198 (Fla. 1933). The Supreme Court
of Michigan has said: "A conditional claim based on performance is as much
under protection of the statute from the outset as a claim which is from its
inception certain and absolute." The claim protected in that case was that
of a railroad to which defendant promised to pay a sum of money when the
road was extended to a certain point and the first train ran. The conveyance
was made during the life of the contract but before completion of the road.
Detroit B. C. & W. R. R. v. Lavell, 224 Mich. 572, 575, 195 N. W. 58, 59 (1923).
And see American Surety Co. of New York v. Marotta, 53 Sup. Ct. 260,
262 (U. S. 1933) ". . . petitioner from the time it became surety on Mogliani's
bond, was entitled as a creditor under the agreement to invoke that rule.'-
i.e. protection against fraudulent conveyances. Compare the statement of the
Supreme Court of Alabama in an action to set aside as fraudulent a convey-
ance by a surety on an administrator's bond: "a contingent claim is as fully
protected, as a claim that is certain and absolute." Yeend v. Weeks, 104 Ala.
331, 341, 16 So. 165, 169 (1893). Accord: Carr v. Goldstein, 210 Ala. 366,
98 So. 199 (1923) (conveyance of property by indorser of note). Though the
surety is thus protected, he is normally denied relief against the fraudulent
conveyance at least until he has paid the obligation. Saunders v. Saunders,
49 Idaho 733, 291 Pac. 1069 (1930).
54. 187 Mass. 426, 73 N. E. 547 (1905).
55. Id. at 428, 73 N. E. at 548. Finger v. Kemp, 163 At. 153 (N. J. Ch.
1932) though denying protection to the landlord, on the Tacts is not contrary
to the general proposition advanced in the text. Prior to the end of a lease the
partners (lessees) conveyed certain personal assets to their wives. About
six months later there was a fire and the partners collected the insurance and
liquidated their other business assets. All debts were paid, including the land-
lord up to the date of the fire. The landlord recovered judgments for sub-
sequentiy maturing rent and brought a bill to set aside the prior conveyances
as being fraudulent. In denying relief the court concluded: (1) the conveyances
did render the partnership insolvent; (2) there was no preconceived intention
"to defeat the lease and to evade the payment of the rent after the fire."
The court said, at 154, "A tenant's contingent liability is adverted to, not
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The various rules evolved as respects these four classes of creditors
are not particularly relevant here."0 Here we are primarily con-
cerned with groups three and four. And, as will be seen, where
the fraudulent conveyance is to a new corporation in which the
old stockholders received stock, the creditors, to whom fair and
reasonable offers of participation in the plan have not been made,
will be allowed to reach the interest of the stockholders in the
property transferred even though their claims fall in the third and
fourth classes above. In other words the type of transaction in-
volved in the Boyd case satisfies the tests of fraudulent conveyances
laid down for the protection of contingent creditors of those classes.
As we have seen, Boyd had a claim of the third type discussed
above, and if there was any doubt as to whether that type of claim
was protected under the principles of the Boyd case, it was dis-
pelled by a later decision of the same court. In Pierce v. United
States 57 it appeared that the Waters Pierce Oil Company was in-
that it affords an escape to responsibility, but merely as indicating the greater
difficulty of finding an actual intention to defraud creditors where the motive
is remote than where a debt exists and the urge is present." And see Conway
v. Raphel, 101 N. J. Eq. 495, 138 Atl. 691 (1927); Severs v. Dodson, 53 N. J.
Eq. 633, 34 Atl. 7 (1895). Cf. Thorp v. Leibrecht, 56 N. J. Eq. 499, 39 Atl.
361 (1898). But see Lawndale Sash & Door Co. v. West Side Trust & Savings
Bank, 207 Ill. App. 3 (1917) discussed infra note 72. While the four classes of
subsequent or contingent creditors discussed in the text have received protection
against fraudulent conveyances, the determinations of what constitute such
conveyances have been by no means uniform. The cases have dealt with a
great variety of situations. Those situations and the refinements in the dif-
ferent rules of law which have been evolved are of little relevancy here, for the
following reasons. As indicated in the text, the corporate lessee is parting
with all of its assets. After the reorganization it will either be dissolved or
remain a propertyless entity. The existence of the claim of the landlord is
known, though the amount may be uncertain. More than that the dominant
or one of the primary motives in the bankruptcy or receivership is frequently
to avoid that type of claim. If the landlord is not provided for or not allowed
to proceed against the new company, while the stockholders of the old company
acquire an interest in the new company, the result would be to permit a debtor
to appropriate his assets to himself, leaving his creditors unpaid. To sanction
this would be to permit the mortgagor to buy in at his own sale. The mis-
cellaneous rules evolved in other situations to determine the rights of sub-
sequent creditors can therefore be disregarded here. And as will be seen they
have been so disregarded by the courts. The case of appropriation by a debtor
of his assets to the exclusion of some of his creditors should satisfy the strictest
criteria of fraudulent conveyances.
56. To be sure what is a fraudulent conveyance against one group is not
necessarily such against another. See Conway v. Raphel, supra note 55; Severs
v. Dodson, supra note 55; Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act §§ 1, 5, 6, and 7.
57. 255 U. S. 398 (1920). Cf. Oehring v. Fox Typewriter Co., 272 Fed.
833 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921).
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dieted in 1907 under the Elkins Act. In 1913 that company sold and
transferred all of its property to another corporation. The pro-
ceeds were distributed among the stockholders of the Waters Pierce
Oil Company. In 1914 the case under the Elkins Act was tried.
The company was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine. Execution
on the judgment was issued and returned nulla bona. The United
States then brought a bill in equity to obtain satisfaction of the
judgment out of the money received by the stockholders. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, except in a particular not
material here. Mkr. Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous court,
said:
"It is contended that the right to bring a creditor's bill did not exist,
because the judgment against the Company was not entered in the trial
court until a year after the Company had divested itself of the property
sought to be reached in this suit; and the Government did not become
a creditor, at all events until after its claim for penalties had ripened
into a judgment. But when a corporation divests itself of all its assets
by distributing them among the stockholders, those having unsatisfied
claims against it may follow the assets, although the claims were contested
and unliquidated at the time when the assets were distributed. It is
true that the bill to reach and apply the assets distributed among the
stockholders cannot, as a matter of equity jurisdiction and procedure, be
filed until the claim has been reduced to judgment and the execution thereon
has been returned unsatisfied, Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150
U. S. 371; but, as a matter of substantive law, the right to follow the
distributed assets (see Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392, 409; Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 223 U. S. 482; Kansas City Southcr Ry. Co. v.
Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 166) applies not only to those who are
creditors in the commercial sense, but to all who hold unsatisfied claims.
A corporation cannot by divesting itself of all property leave remediless
the holder of a contingent claim, or the obligee of an executory contract,
Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Co. v. Interstate Telegraph, Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 50,
or the holder of a claim in tort, Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; Jahn v.
Champagne Lumber Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 407; and there is no good reason
why the United States with a claim for penalties should be in a worse
plight." 58
Of course, the claim of a landlord might be contingent in quite a
different sense than the claims in the Boyd and Pierce cases. In
the latter cases all of the events on which liability was predicated
had occurred prior to the consummation of the reorganization plan.
In the case of a landlord the situation might be quite different.
Several possibilities exist:
58. 255 U. S. at 402-403.
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(1) Prior to the petition in bankruptcy or prior to the end of the
period for filing claims in receivership the tenant might have breached
the lease, thus giving the landlord a provable claim. The claim
though unliquidated would clearly fall under the protection of the
Boyd case.
(2) In case of a breach the landlord would normally have the
option to terminate the lease by re-entry or acceptance of a sur-
render; or to stand on his lease and demand the rent as it matured
under the lease; or to re-enter and claim for damages. If the land-
lord elects to terminate, he is pursuing a remedy comparable to
rescission and thereupon is barred by his own act from participation
in the reorganization. 0 He may, however, desire to stand on his
lease and collect the rent as it matures.0 0 Furthermore, for the
protection of the estate the trustees or receivers have the option
to adopt the lease,61 except against the exercise of a right of entry
reserved.62  If they do adopt,03 they ordinarily may sell.04  And
59. For the common law rule that the landlord would have no further claim
against the lessee in case of reentry and eviction in absence of the survival of
an independent covenant, see International Publications, Inc. v. Matchabelli,
260 N. Y. 451, 184 N. E. 51 (1933); Gardiner v. Butler, supra note 6; Cornwell
v. Sandford, 222 N. Y. 248, 118 N. E. 620 (1918); Sutton v. Goodman, 194
Mass. 389, 80 N. E. 608 (1907); In re Rite's Clothes, Inc., 49 F. (2d) 393
(S. D. N. Y. 1931). The same result follows in case of an acceptance of an
offer to surrender. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y. 388,
56 N. E. 903 (1900); Bernard v. Renard, 175 Cal. 230, 165 Pac. 694 (1917);
Underhill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 2.69, 30 N. E. 576 (1892); Schnebly, Operatito
Facts in Surrenders (1927) 22 ILL. L. Rzv. 23, 117; McCormick, The Rights of
the Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant (1925) 23
MIcH. L. Ray. 211; Updegraff, The Element of Intent in Surrender by Operation
of Law (1924) 38 HARV. L. Rav. 64; T. A. D. Jones Co. v. Winchester Repeating
Arms Co., 55 F. (2d) 944 (D. Conn. 1932).
60. That the landlord, who elects to stand on his lease, is in general under
no duty to relet but may hold the tenant liable for rent as it becomes due,
see McCormick, supra note 59; Goldman v. Broyles, 141 S. W. 283 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911); Heighes v. Porterfield, 28 N. M. 445, 214 Pac. 323 (1923); Moerrill
v. Willis, 51 Neb. 162, 70 N. W. 914 (1897); National Exchange Bank v. Hann,
33 Okla. 516, 126 Pac. 554 (1911); Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370 (1882). But see
Note (1927) 6 N. C. L. Rav. 68; Roberts v. Watson, 196 Ia. 816, 195 N. W. 211
(1923); Brown v. Cairns, 63 Kan. 584, 66 Pac. 639 (1901); Martin v. Slegley,
123 Wash. 683, 212 Pac. 1057 (1923). See generally Note (1926) 40 A. L. R.
190.
61. In re Frazin, 183 Fed. 28 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) (bankruptcy); In ro
Kreiger, 15 F. (2d) 90 (W. D. Pa. 1926) (bankruptcy); Oscar Heineman
Corp. v. Nat Levy & Co. 6 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (equity receivership);
Stokes v. Hoffman House, 167 N. Y. 554, 60 N. E. 667 (1901) (equity re-
ceivership).
62. Cassidy v. E. M. T. Coal Co., 204 Ky. 278, 264 S. W. 744 (1924)
(bankruptcy); In re Elk Brook Coal *Co., 261 Fed. 445 (M. D. Pa. 1919)
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the lessor gets the benefit of an assumption of obligations by the
assignee, who, in case of a reorganization, would likely be the new
company. In such event the lessor is in a position somewhat com-parable to a mortgagee whose underlying mortgage is not disturbedby the bankruptcy or receivership. If, however, the trustee or
receiver disaffirms and the landlord elects to re-enter and claim fordamages, he would be in the position of a creditor with an unliquid-
ated claim.(3) In the latter event or in case he elects to stand on his lease
and claim for rent as it matures, his claim might not be provable
either in bankruptcy or receivership. For example, in jurisdictions
which adhere to the rule of In re Roth & Appel 05 the lessee mayhave seen to it that at the filing of the bankruptcy petition rent
was paid in advance. The breach would occur subsequently, toolate to satisfy the test of provability under that decision. Or in
case of equity receivership the rent may have been paid regularly
up to the date of the confirmation of the sale. In either case it
may be assumed that there was no provable claim in bankruptcy
or equity receivership. Under these circumstances the claim wouldbe contingent-at the points of time at issue-in a sense quitedifferent from the contingent nature of the claims in the Boyd
and Pierce cases. In the latter cases all events on which liability
was predicated had occurred. In the landlord case they had not.To be sure the contract on which a claim is subsequently asserted
was in existence; but whether or not a claim would ever arise was
(bankruptcy); Empress Theatre Co. v. Horton, 266 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 8th,1920). See Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 390; Note (1920) 33 HAnv. L. REv.709; Note (1920) 29 YAix L. J. 562; Note (1915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 328. That
such power of reentry was valid at common law as against assignees undera bankruptcy commission, see Roe v. Galliers, 2 T. R. 133 (K. B. 1787); GRAY,RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OP PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895) § 101.63. Adoption by a statutory receiver or a trustee in bankruptcy is said tocreate a privity of estate between him and the lessor making him liable onthe covenant to pay rent. Woodruff v. Erie Ry. Co., 93 N. Y. 609 (1883)(statutory receiver); Summerville v. Kelliher, 144 Cal. 155, 77 Pac. 889 (1904)(bankruptcy); Ex parte Faxon, Fed. Cas. No. 4704 (C. D. Mass. 1869) (bank-
ruptcy). But in case of a chancery receiver it has been held that no suchprivity of estate can be created between him and the lessor by which he canbecome liable on the covenant to pay rent. Stokes v. Hoffman House, 
-uprenote 61. And see Durand & Co. v. Howard & Co., 216 Fed. 585, 591 (C. C. A.2d, 1914); In re Monticello Veneer Co., 2 Fed. Supp. 27 (S. D. Miss. 1933).But see United States Trust Co. v. Wabash Western Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287(1893).
64. See In re Sherwoods, Inc., 210 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Gazlay v.Williams, 210 U. S. 41 (1908); Kirstein Holding Co. v. Bangor Veritas, Inc.,163 AtI. 655 (Me. 1933).
65. Note 3, supra.
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unknown. Thus there is the difference between (1) a claim con-
tingent in the sense of being unliquidated and contested, and (2)
a claim contingent in the sense that it may never arise. But as
we have seen above, creditors of the latter class have been brought
within the protection of the statutes against fraudulent conveyances.
Hence it is no surprise to find them being protected under the prin-
ciples of the Boyd case.
In Hamer v. New York Rys. Co. Il the lessor of a street railway
issued bonds guaranteed by the lessee. In 1907 the lessee-guarantor
went into receivership and default was made on the bonds. A
foreclosure suit was brought and a deficiency judgment entered
against the lessee February 20, 1912. Meanwhile, however, the
assets of the lessee had been sold to a new company pursuant to
a reorganization plan. The plan made no provision for the claims
of bondholders on the guaranty. In fact the federal district court
refused to allow the claim for the deficiency judgment to be proved
in the receivership of the lessee-guarantor because the date as of
which claims against the property were ordered to be pr6ved was
January 15, 1908, and on that date the claim on the guaranty was
"contingent merely." In 1913 the bondholders brought suit against
the new company to enforce the liability of the old company. The
case involved procedural matters not material here. Mr. Justice
Brandeis noted, however, that the "bill set forth facts to bring the
case within the rule declared '* in the Boyd and Kansas City Southern
cases. Thus it is assumed without emphasis that the Boyd case
extends to this class of creditor. What happened in the Hamer
case is likely to happen in cases of landlords. The claim may mature
after the time for provability but nevertheless before the reorgan-
ization is consummated. Normally the trustee in bankruptcy or
equity receiver would adopt or disaffirm leases within a reason-
able time. Yet a disaffirmance would not make a claim for rent
or damages automatically provable. The Hamer case indicates that
provability is immaterial and that non-l rovability is not per se
a bar to an action by a creditor to reach the assets transferred to
the new company.
An even stronger case for liability of the new company is Howard
v. Maxwell Motor Co., Inc. 67 The case involved the contingent claim
of a landlord and is of such importance that it deserves extended
comment. In 1909 plaintiffs leased to the Maxwell-Briscoe Chicago
Company (hereafter called the Chicago Company) realty for a term
of 20 years. The lease was guaranteed by the Maxwell-Briscoe Motor
66. 244 U. S. 266 (1917).
67. 269 Fed. 292 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
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Company (hereafter called the Motor Company) of which the
Chicago Company was a sales subsidiary. In 1912 equity receivers
were appointed under a consent decree for the Motor Company and
for its parent (the United States Motor Company) and other affili-
ates, but not for the Chicago Company. A reorganization plan was
formulated which made no provision for plaintiffs. It did, however,
provide for participation by stockholders of the United States Motor
Company (among whom was the Motor Company) on payment of
an assessment. A sale pursuant to the reorganization plan was
made to the Maxwell Motor Company. A decree confirming the
sale was entered January 11, 1913. The decree of sale gave the
purchaser 60 days to elect whether or not to "adopt or assume any
lease, agreement, or other contract which may be included in the
property sold." On the last day of the 60 day period (March 11,
1913), defendant gave notice of intention not to assume the Motor
Company's guaranty of plaintiffs' lease. But during the whole
course of the receivership the rent had been paid promptly and in ad-
vance. In fact on March 10, 1913 quarterly rent had been paid
in advance until the next rent day, June 10, 1913. Rent falling due
then was not paid. On June 24, 1913 the Chicago Company (the
lessee) fied a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and on June 27, 1913
was adjudicated. After paying a small percentage on its debts, it
was discharged. In August, 1913 plaintiffs brought suit against
the Motor Company on its guaranty. Final judgment was entered
in 1917 and after execution was returned unsatisfied a bill in equity
was brought to satisfy the judgment out of the assets of the Max-
well Motor Company, Incorporated.
The special master found that there was no actual fraud but that
the old stockholders had an equity in the property out of which un-
secured creditors such as plaintiffs could be paid. The report of
the special master recommending that plaintiffs have a decree was
sustained and a decree entered. Judge Mayer observed that though
provisions for the other unsecured creditors were fair, nevertheless
a single creditor not paid or provided for in the reorganization was
entitled to protection under the Boyd case. The measure of recovery
here as in the Boyd case was the interest of the stockholders in
the property in an amount not exceeding, of course, the plaintiffs'
claim.
Judge Mayer's conclusions on the contingent nature of the claim
are of peculiar interest. He stated, as did the special master, that
the plaintiffs' claim did not satisfy the tests of provability in equity
receiverships but went on to indicate that the ordinary tests of
provability are applicable only to creditors' reorganizations, or
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dissolution proceedings, in which stockholders do not participate.
On that point he said:
"If, therefore, this estate had been wound up prior to March 11, 1913,
without a stockholders' reorganization, this claim would not have been
provable, and would have been barred.
"In such cases there is a fund for distribution, and the necessity for
ascertaining claims 'at a time consistent with the expeditious settlement'
of estates is the reason for holding as nonprovable those claims 'which
are so uncertain that their worth cannot be ascertained,' even if such
claims be 'highly meritorious' . . . "1s
In other words, where the liquidation or reorganization concerns
creditors only, contingent claims of the type of plaintiffs' need not
be recognized. 69
But where stockholders participate, the law of fraudulent con-
veyances transcends all rules of provability. To state it another
way, equity will not permit a debtor to avail itself of judicial pro-
tection in order to appropriate to itself property out of which its
obligations should first be satisfied. As Judge Mayer stated:
"But where, as here, there is a stockholders' reorganization, and the
new company by its own act sets in motion the default which matures
a contingent into an absolute liability, a court of equity cannot permit it
to benefit by that act.
"If defendant Maxwell Motor Company, Incorporated, had let March
11, 1913, go by without filing its intention not to assume the lease, it
would have been liable to plaintiffs. When it became the owner of the
property of Maxwell-Briscoe Motor Company, it kmew or ought to have
known the latter's contingent liability in respect of this lease, and it
would be strange if a court of equity would permit a creditor to be so
positioned as to prevent him from proving his claim or participating in
a reorganization, while at the same time leaving him remediless by virtue
of the act of a corporation created as a part of the plan of reorganization;
for it must not be forgotten that the March rent was paid after the
decree of sale and after the delivery of the property thereunder to Maxwell
Motor Company, Incorporated.
"It is suggested that, if the conclusions of the special master be sus-
tained, difficulties will arise in working out the plans of beneficial re-
organizations; but I think this is a needless fear. Equity usually succeeds
in molding its decrees to the requirements of the situation with which
it deals, and finds a way to practical as well as just results." 10
68. Id. at 305.
69. Cf. pp. 1036 et seq. discussing the cases which disregard the ordinary
tests of provability where the corporate lessee is being dissolved.
70. 269 Fed. at 305-306.
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol, 421024
1933] LANDLORDS' CLAIMS 1025
This decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in
a per curiam opinion.7 1 There is no contrary decision; 7-2 nor have
the reasoning'and result of the Howard case ever been questioned
in subsequent decisions.
If the lessee rather than the guarantor were being reorganized
in equity receivership, it would usually be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to prevent the landlord's claim from maturing (though per-
haps not from being liquidated) prior to the end of the period for
proof of claims. The receiver would normally be allowed a reason-
able time to disaffirm or to adopt; 73 and that period would usually
antedate the final date for filing. But in case of bankruptcy, if the
rule of provability announced in In re Roth & Appel 7 4 is followed,
a disaffirmance of the lease by the trustee would not make the land-
lord's claim provable even though the time for filing claims had
not run. Hence, by careful engineering, counsel for lessees could
keep the landlord's damage claim wholly contingent and make it
non-provable. In that event, however, the claim would be no less
secure than that of plaintiffs' in the Howard case. In fact the
engineering of the claim in case of bankruptcy of the lessee could
71. 275 Fed. 53 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
72. Lawndale Sash & Door Co. v. West Side Trust & Savings Bank, 207
IIl. App. 3 (1917) is the only case found which even implies a result contra
to that of the Howard case. But the case is not reported in full and the facts
are not recited. The only reported opinion is in the form of a headnote abstract.
What apparently happened was a transfer of assets by one corporation to
another corporation, the latter issuing stock to old stockholders and assuming
all debts of the transferor. The plaintiff was a landlord of the transferor.
No rent was due at the time of the transfer. For rent maturing thereafter
the landlord garnisheed funds (apparently accounts receivable) which had been
transferred to the new corporation. Judgment dismissing the suit was affirmed.
One head note said, "One who leases premises to a corporation is not a creditor
of a corporation at the time of the sale of the business of the corporation to
another, where there is no rent due under the lease at the time of the sale."
The fraudulent conveyance statute and its use of th term "other persons"
was said to refer "to persons having a substantial existing claim against
parties or property sought to be brought within the terms of the statute." This
interpretation is not in accord with the great weight of authority. See cases,
supra notes 48-53. Whether the Boyd case was argued does not appear. But
apparently the theory of the garnishment was not the liability of the stock-
holder's interest in the old company. Similarly, see Apex Leasing Co. Inc. v.
Litke, 173 App. Div. 323, 159 N. Y. Supp. 707 (1st Dept. 1916) holding the
landlord not a creditor under the Bulk Sales Act. It seems likely in that case
that the lessee was the controlling stockholder in the corporation to which the
assets were transferred. No reference was made to the Boyd case nor to its
reasoning. Apparently the sole strategy of the case was to bring the landlord
into the word "creditors" in the Bulk Sales Act.
73. See cases cited supra note 61.
74. Note 3, supra.
not normally be so prolonged as in the Howard case. Ordinarily
the trustee would have to move with reasonable dispatch to dis-
affirm or adopt. In case of disaffirmance the landlord's damage
claim could ordinarily be matured (though perhaps not liquidated)
prior to the consummation of the plan.75 Hence both in equity re-
ceivership and bankruptcy where a corporate lessee is being reor-
ganized under a plan permitting participation by old stockholders
of the lessee, the presence of the landlord's claim for damages nor-
mally can be asserted prior to the date of consummation of the plan.
In other words, the Hbward case is doubtless one of the most ex-
treme cases likely to arise. If the Boyd case applies to such a case,
a fortiori it would apply where the landlord matures his damage
claim at an earlier period.
It might be insisted of course that the design of the guarantor
in the Howard case to prevent the claim from maturing earlier
was so conspicuous and the intent to bar or defraud the landlord
so apparent that the decision is of rather limited application. To
this two answers may be made. In the first place where the desire
to avoid leases is the dominant or a major motivation for bank.
ruptcy or receivership the design to bar the landlord is as con-
spicuous as in the Howard case. Certainly the meticulous care
which counsel for tenants have employed in many cases to keep
the claim of the .landlord from becoming provable supplies the
element of intent present in the Howard case. In the second place,
however, such intent is not a necessary element. Though the
avoidance of the lease is merely an incidental feature of the reor-
ganization procedure the principles of the Boyd case are equally
applicable. As noted above it is not necessarily actual fraud that
vitiates a transaction like that in the Boyd case. Constructive fraud
alone is sufficient. Clear and obvious machinations are not neces-
sary. The existence of a contract out of which a claim is likely
to arise is wholly adequate.
It has been before noted that the Boyd case applies as well to
reorganizations in bankruptcy as to those in equity receivership.
Congress has not legislated otherwise. The only relevant section
of the Bankruptcy Act is that relating to discharges. To be sure
the corporate lessee in bankruptcy may be granted its discharge;
but the discharge would affect only provable claims. The landlord
having by hypothesis a non-provable claim would remain unaffected.
He would accordingly have a claim against the lessee which would
come under the protection of the Boyd case. This result follows
75. See discussion infra pp. 1044 et seq. concerning rules of law in some
states preventing suit against the tenant until the end of the term.
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even though the lessee has effected a composition in bankruptcy.
Thus in Friend v. Talcott,70 decided at the same term as the Boyd
case, defendant offered a composition in bankruptcy which was con-
firmed. His discharge was thereby granted. Plaintiff was at the
time a creditor for goods sold and delivered. He participated in the
composition, receiving dividends on his claim. Thereafter he sued
in deceit for damages in procuring the sale of goods on credit, the
damages sought being the difference between the price of the goods
and the dividends paid upon the composition. The Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment for plaintiff holding that, because a claim based
on deceit is not barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, plaintiff's
cause of action was exempted from the discharge effected through
the composition, and that by proving in the composition he had not
elected to waive the cause of action for deceit.
Thus property returned to the debtor as a result of the compo-
sition or subsequently acquired by him may be reached by creditors
who do not have claims affected by the discharge. The composition
consideration reserved for creditors who participate in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings may not, it is true, be reached by other credi-
tors. But all other property in which the debtor has an interest
may be reached in the same manner as if he had never gone through
bankruptcy. This is illustrated by In re FrischklZeht. 7  A lessee
of realty was adjudicated a banlrupt. At the time of the filing of
the petition rent had been paid in advance. Under the rule in the
Second Circuit the landlord therefore had no provable claim. After
adjudication the lessee offered a composition to his creditors, which
was confirmed. The composition consideration was deposited by
the trustee for payment to creditors under the composition. The
compensation and expenses of the attorneys were not, however, in-
cluded in that consideration, the attorneys having waived in writing
the deposit of a sum sufficient to pay their fees. The day after the
composition was confirmed the lessor brought suit for rent accruing
after the filing of the petition. In that action he attached a sum
owing the bankrupt lessee by a third party. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy moved to vacate the attachment on the ground, inter alia,
that the sum attached was vested in the trustee and being in custodia
legis was not subject to attachment. Judgment denying the motion
was affirmed. The court said:
" . . . we have no authority under the law to grant the petition of the
trustee. We do not agree with him in thinking that the moneys or the
76. 228 U. S. 27 (1913). Cf. Myers v. International Trust Co., 263 U. S.
64 (1923).
77. 223 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
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accounts in the hands of these bankers, which they obtained from this
bankrupt prior to his bankruptcy, were in custodia legis at the time of
the attachment. When the court confirmed the composition, the title to
these moneys and accounts under the Bankruptcy Act at once revested
in the bankrupt; and such moneys and accounts might have been forthwith
handed over to the bankrupt by the bankers without asking the permission
of the trustee, or the bankrupt without the consent of the trustee could
have maintained an action against the bankers to recover the same. We
cannot import into the act what Congress left out of it. The language
of the act is that upon confirmation of a composition the title of the
bankrupt to his property shall 'thereupon revest in him.'
"The funds which have been attached, and which the trustee is seeking
to reach, have never been in the actual custody of the trustee, and formed
no part of the sum deposited in the composition proceeding, and the
trustee has no right now to reduce them into his possession. The con-
firmation of the composition operated to supersede the proceedings in
bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Act operated automatically to revest the
bankrupt with the title to his property." 78
From this line of cases it follows that if the corporate lessee
effects a reorganization in bankruptcy-whether or not by means
of a composition-and the stockholders participate therein, a land-
lord who is offered no participation in the plan may subsequently,
on maturing and liquidating his claim, reach the interest of the
stockholders in the old company under the principle of the Boyd
case. It is clear, as noted above, that discharge in bankruptcy in
nowise affects claims that are not provable. Creditors holding such
claims may still reach the assets of the debtor corporation, whether
those returned to it under the composition or those subsequently
acquired. Since those assets are liable for the payment of such
undischarged claims, any transaction which transfers those assets
to a new company in which the debtor's stockholders participate is
as much a fraudulent conveyance as the transaction involved in the
Boyd case.
, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Tramley, Inc. 70 is not necessarily
contrary to this result. There the creditors of a corporate lessee
(a one man corporation) filed a petition in bankruptcy against it.
Plaintiff was a surety on several bonds given to secure the payment
of rent upon various leases of real property held by the corporation.
But since the rent was fully paid at the time of the filing of the
petition, plaintiff had not become a creditor of the lessee with a
78. Id. at 420-421. And see Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625 (1913); Wilmot
v. Mudge, 103 U. S. 217 (1880); Wheeling Structural Steel Co. v. Moss, 62
F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
79. 260 N. Y. 280, 183 N. E. 425 (1932).
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provable claim. A composition offered by the lessee to its creditors was
confirmed. All provable claims were to receive 15% in cash; 157o
in notes of a new company to which the assets were to be trans-
ferred, the notes being guaranteed by the stockholder and secured
by the common stock of the new company; and 205 in preferred
stock of the new company. The new corporation was formed; the
assets were transferred to it; and the composition consideration
was distributed to the creditors. The old stockholder became the
sole common stockholder of the new corporation. Meanwhile
plaintiff's claim against the old corporation had matured and been
liquidated. Judgment was recovered and execution returned un-
satisfied. Action was then brought against the new company on
the grounds of a fraudulent conveyance. The Appellate Division
affirmed a judgment of the Special Term establishing a lien on the
assets of the new company for satisfaction of the judgment. The
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and dismissed the com-
plaint.
Mention need not be made of the deficiencies in the complaint
since the court did not make the decision turn on them. Several
factors mentioned by the court should, however, be noted.
(1) To the conclusion of the Special Term that the transfer was
fraudulent, the Court of Appeals took exception. It said that "not
a fact may be adduced which impugns the good faith of the com-
position or the transfer provided therein." 80 As noted, however,
the presence of good faith is absolutely immaterial and irrelevant
under the doctrine of the Boyd case. The Supreme Court made
clear that it was the "constructive," and not the actual fraud in-
volved in the Northern Pacific reorganization that made it void as
against Boyd. In the Tramley case the Court went on to say: "It
could not have been fraudulent unless we are prepared to say that
the District Court which approved it, was a participant in the
fraud." 81 The Supreme Court in the Boyd case did not hesitate to
override a judicial sale made by an eminently honest and upright
court. There is thus no such sanctity in a judicial sale that it can
withstand all attack except that of actual fraud. On this point
then the line of reasoning of the Court of Appeals is contrary to
some of the most fundamental concepts of reorganization law.
(2) The Court of Appeals concluded that "plaintiff was a party
to the bankruptcy proceedings through the notices published to all
creditors" and that the proceeding being in rem the "District Court
had adequate and exclusive power to make disposal of the res ...
80. Id. at 286, 183 N. E. at 426.
81. Id. at 287, 183 N. E. at 426.
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and to pass unassailable title to such assets." 11 It is clear, how-
ever, that under the rules of the Talcott case and In re Frschknecht
the bankruptcy court does not have the power to bar suits by credi-
tors with non-provable claims; but that they may sue after the
composition discharge and reach any assets then owned by the
debtor.8 3 The only "unassailable title" that the bankruptcy court
can pass is the composition consideration. It is clear that plaintiff
could not reach that but could reach assets title to which was in the
debtor.
(3)" The Court of Appeals went on to say: "The transfer, made
in compliance with the composition, could have defrauded no credi-
tor, since only those creditors entitled to share in the transferred
assets, of whom the plaintiff was not one, were the sole beneficiaries
thereof, and expressly gave their consent thereto." 84 If the court
means that, as respects the, composition consideration, plaintiff can-
not reach it, the result is obviously sound. But for the court to
speak of the composition creditors as the "sole beneficiaries" is
contrary to fact. The record shows, 85 as has been noted, that the
old stockholder participated in the new company by taking all of
its common stock. So far the situation is a typical creditors-stock-
holders reorganization including some but not all creditors. Sub-
stitute a composition for a judicial sale and a small corporation
for a big corporation and you have in the Tramley case substantially
a duplicate of the Boyd and Howard cases. Now, the Supreme
Court has said that the creditor is entitled to reach the stockholders'
interest in the old company. What was that interest in the Trarnley
case? The stock was pledged to secure notes given to the creditors
under the composition.8 6 The -stockholder therefore had, at the time
of suit, only the interest of a stockholder who has pledged his
shares. But that interest might or might not be valuable. Hence
82. Ibid., 183 N. E. at 427. In view of the lack of jurisdiction of the Bank-
ruptcy court over plaintiff's claim the situation is in no way comparable to that
in St. Louis & San Francisco RR. V. Spiller, 274 U. S. 304 (1927), See dis-
cussion of that case in Frank, supra note 34-second installment, to appear in
(May, 1933) 17 VA. L. REV. _.
Technically, the property under the composition revested in the bankrupt
which in turn conveyed to the new company. In re Frischknecht, supra note 77.
83. Cf. International Life Insurance Co. v. Sherman, 262 V. S. 346 (1923).
Certainly plaintiff in the Tramley case was no more a party to the proceedings
than was Boyd in the Boyd case. See discussion of the International Life
Insurance case in Frank, supra note 82. As to jurisdiction of the banlruptcy
court over plaintiff see infra, pp. 1032 et seq.
84. 260 N. Y. at 287, 183 N. E. at 426.
85. Record on Appeal, p. 30, fol. 89.
86. Id. p. 22, fol. 65; p. 30, fol. 89; pp. 51-54, fols. 150-162.
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it is impossible to agree with the court that the creditors were the
sole beneficiaries.
(4) The measure of recovery granted by the lower courts was
,denounced by the Court of Appeals which said:
"The Special Term, although finding that the transfer authorized by
the composition, and approved by the Federal Court, was fraudulent and
void, made no provision for the restoration of the status quo before the
transfer, the ordinary result flowing from a rescission for fraud. Instead,
it provided that the assets of Lucy Lou Shops, Inc., remaining in the
hands of Tramley, Inc., be and remain subject to a lien in favor of the
plaintiff for the security of its judgment. Under the composition agree-
ment, the creditors were to receive satisfaction of their claims to the
extent of twenty per cent thereof in the form of preferred stock of Tram-
ley, Inc. The preferred stock to be paid over was stock in a corporation
the assets of which were unincumbered by any lien. Thus, it is apparent
that when the Special Term declared the assets of Tramley, Inc., subject
to a lien in favor of the plaintiff, it made an attempt not only to alter
the terms of an agreement, as made between the parties, but as well to
amend the terms of an order of the Federal court confirming the agree-
ment. If valid, this strange result would have followed: The plaintiff,
not having in bankruptcy a provable claim, even as a general creditor,
through a composition arising in bankruptcy, but modified by the Special
Term, would have become a preferred creditor, having a right to distri-
bution superior to all creditors whose claims had been allowed by the
bankruptcy court . . . "87
On this point the Court of Appeals is clearly right. The recovery
awarded cuts under the composition-consideration. Neither the
Bankruptcy Act nor the Boyd case would permit that. But because
plaintiff received too much does not warrant dismissal of the com-
plaint. Under the doctrine of the Boyd case he is entitled to reach
the stockholders' interest. Here that was an interest of a pledgor
of shares. How valuable it was does not appear. The fact of the
matter is that the line of decisions represented by the Boyd case
were not even mentioned or discussed in the briefs nor, so we have
been advised, were they even referred to in argument. The Court
of Appeals in its reasoning seems oblivious of the fact that there
was a Boyd case. In refusing to allow the plaintiff to reach the
interest of the creditors in the new company it proceeded consis-
tently with the rules of the Boyd case. But in failing to examine the
composition as providing a retention by the debtor of an interest
in his property as against a non-participating creditor it in effect
condoned what the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
condemned.
87. 260 N. Y. at 288-289, 183 N. E. at 427.
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(5) The essence of the decision, however, is apparently a juris-
dictional point. The court said, "The Special Term had no juris-
diction to declare the transfer fraudulent. The Bankruptcy Act
makes an exclusive provision whereby a composition may be set
aside . . . " (quoting Section 13). It then proceeded to state that
in "matters relating to bankruptcy" the power of the federal courts
"is paramount" and "essentially exclusive," and cited various texts
on bankruptcy to the effect that an order of confirmation of a com-
position in bankruptcy "cannot be assailed collaterally in any other
court even for fraud in procuring it." 88
That is fundamental in the law of bankruptcy.80 But the cases
establishing that rule relate solely to attacks on the validity or effi-
88. Id. at 287-288, 183 N. E. at 427.
89. Abbott v. Anderson, 31 Am. B. Rep. 877 (Ill. App. 1914); Turner v.
Hudson, 105 Me. 476, 75 Atl. 45 (1909); Loeffler v. Wright, 13 Cal. App. 224,
109 Pac. 269 (1910). And see In re Roukous, 128 Fed. 648 (D. R. I. 1904).
§ 21 (f) provides: "A certified copy of an order confirming or setting aside a
composition, or granting or setting aside a discharge, not revoked, shall be
evidence of the jurisdiction of the court, the regularity of the proceedings,
and of the fact that the order was made."
§ 13 provides: "The judge may, upon the application of parties in interest
made at any time within six months after a composition has been confirmed,
set the same aside and reinstate the case if it shall be made to appear upon
a trial that fraud was practiced in the procuring of such composition, and
that the knowledge thereof has come to the petitioners since the confirmation
of such composition."
By § 2 (9): "courts of bankruptcy" are empowered to "confirm or reject
compositions between debtors and their creditors, and set aside compositions
and reinstate the cases."
Under these sections it is clear that if the composition is to be set aside
and creditors are to be restored to their original position, application must be
made to the court confirming the composition. In addition to the cases supra,
see In re Ennis, 183 Fed. 859 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
Analogous situations are attacks on sales by trustees not satisfyiIng certain
statutory requirements but which cannot be attacked collaterally. Robertson
v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254 (1913). And collateral attacks on a discharge by
creditors with provable claims who seek .to show irregularities in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings but who are barred from doing so in such proceedings.
Harris v. Steinwax, 205 App. Div. 317, 199 N. Y. Supp. 447 (1st Dept. 1923);
Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U. S. 21 (1915).
But even if petition is made to the bankruptcy court to set aside the com-
position it is held that § 13 "sets forth the only grounds for setting aside an
order confirming a composition." In re Isidor Klein, Inc., 22 F. (2d) 006
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927). And see In re Vandeweghe, 49 F. (2d) 939 (S. D. N. Y.
1931); In re Graff, 242 Fed. 577 (E. D. N. Y. 1917); In re Eisenberg, 148
Fed. 325 (S. D. N. Y. 1906).
Even jurisdiction to determine conflicting claims of right to participate in
composition fund has been denied the bankruptcy court after confirmation
of composition. In 'e Converse-Hough & Co., Inc., 27 F. (2d) 368 (W. D.
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cacy of the composition by parties to it.3 They do not establish
the rule that a creditor not a party to the composition, and over
whose claim the court has no jurisdiction may not subsequently
reach the debtor's interest in the property revested in him by the
composition. In fact, under the composition section it seems that
the federal court has no jurisdiction to include in a composition
creditors who do not have provable claims. Section 12 provides
for acceptance by a majority in number (and majority in amount)
of all "creditors whose claims have been allowed." 01 Participation
is reserved to those with provable claims, with the result that a
creditor with a non-provable claim would have no power to set
aside a composition under Section 13 of the Banlruptcy Act.02 This
N. Y. 1928). Cf. Fulton National Bank v. Hozier, 267 U. S. 276 (1925);
California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
90. See cases cited note 89, supra.
91. The power is given the bankrupt by § 12 to offer either before or
after adjudication "terms of composition to his creditors." The Vord "credi-
tor" as used throughout the act "shall, unless the same be inconsistent with
the context, be construed" to "include anyone who owns a demand or claim
provable in bankruptcy... " § 1 (9) Cf. American Surety Co. of New
York v. Marotta, supra note 53.
It is implicit in the composition cases that only those with provable claims
are entitled to participate in the composition. See c. g. In re Yamini Dry
Goods Co., 295 Fed. 733 (N. D. Tex. 1923); In re Frischknecht, supra note 77,
at 420; In re Adler, 103 Fed. 444, 447-448 (W. D. Tenn. 1900). Of cource,
unliquidated and even disputed and contested claims must be provided for in
the deposit of the consideration. In re Everick Art Corp., 39 F. (2d) 765
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930). Cf. Phelan v. Parsons, 23 F. (2d) '7 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
92. This is indicated not only because of the construction of "creditors"
in § 12 as indicated supra note 91, but for the following reasons as well:
(1) While scheduled claims may be permitted to participate in the com-
position though not filed within the statutory period provided for filing [Nassau
Smelting & Refining Works, Ltd. v. Brightwood Bronze Foundry Co., 265
U. S. 269 (1924)], even provable claims filed after the meeting of creditors
to vote on the composition cannot be counted in determining whether or not
a majority of creditors approve the composition. Miller's Apparel, Inc. v.
H. Simonoff & Son, Inc., 29 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928). A fortiori,
creditors without provable claims would have no vote on the composition.
(2) § 13 of the Bankruptcy Act provides for setting aside of a compo-
sition "upon the application of parties in interest. ' It seems clear that a
creditor without a provable claim and therefore one Vhose claim would not
be discharged by the composition is not a party "in interest." Under § 14
similar language is used respecting the right to oppose a discharge. The
granting of a discharge may be opposed "by the trustee or other parties in
interest." And some courts have held that a creditor whose claim is not dis-
chargeable (though provable) is not entitled to oppose the discharge or to
have it revoked. In re Servis, 140 Fed. 222 (N. D. Ia. 1905); In re Main,
205 Fed. 421 (N. D. Ia. 1913); In re Chandler, 138 Fed. 637 (C. C. A. 7th,
1905); In re Gara, 190 Fed. 112 (E. D. Pa. 1911); In re Menzin, 233 Fed.
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reasoning would by negative implication deprive the federal court
of the power to bar non-provable claims. As established by the
Talcott and, Frischknecht cases the creditor with a non-provable
(or otherwise undischarged) claim remains unaffected in the sense
that he may still, reach assets to which his debtor has title when
he brings suit. Following the reasoning of the court in the Tramley
case, the Talcett; and Friskknecht cases were wrongly decided.
They were no more "collateral attacks" on the composition than
was the Tramley, case, In fact it is, a misnomer to call suits of that
character "collateral attacks" on the composition. They were at-
tempts to reach, assets, of the debtor remaining after the consumma,
tion of a composition-not to reach the composition consideration.
And the complaint in the Tramley case was susceptible of the same
interpretation.
It is evident on, a reading of the Talcott and Frischknacht cases
that it was not necessary for those creditors to apply to the court
having jurisdiction over the composition in order to reach assets of
333 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). But see Ez part& Traphagen, Fed. Cas. No. 14140
(S. D. N. Y. 1842),. Cf. In re Maples, 105 Fed. 919 (D, Mont. 1901) (volun-
tary petition scheduling no non-exempt property and only one debt, and that
non-dischargeable, is no basis for adjudication). Others have held he may
oppose the discharge even if his claim is not dischargeable provided it Is
provable. In re Feuer, 4 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); I7z, ro Armstrong,
248 Fed. 292 (S. D. Cal. 1918); In re Lewis, 163 Fed. 137 (E. D. N. Y. 1908);
In re Reed, 191 Fed. 920 (W. D. Okla. 1911). And see In re Tebbetts, Fed.
Cas. No. 13817 (C. C. D. Mass. 1842) under bankruptcy act of 1841; In 1-0
Perelstine, 15 F. (2d) 64, (W. D. Pa. 1926).
Likewise he may if his claim was provable though not proved. Ia ro Bim-
berg, 121 Fed. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); In re Conroy, 134 Fed. 764 (E. D.
Pa. 1905); In re Nathanson, 155 Fed. 645 (E. D. N. Y. 1907).
There is good sense in permitting a creditor with a provable but not dis.
chargeable claim to oppose the discharge, At the time of the hearing on the
discharge it may be uncertain whether or not he can later establish his claim
as being non-dischargeable. This uncertainty would clearly exist in actions
for fraud and deceit. If he can defeat the discharge he strengthens his chances
of getting judgment. For this reason the court in In re Fever', supra, said
"there is no good reason for saying he may not have two strings to his bow."
The close similarity in language between the sections providing for oppo-
sition to a discharge and application for setting aside a composition indicate
that the foregoing cases would be applicable in interpreting "parties in interest"
in § 13. Cf. In re Downtown Wet Wash Laundry, Inc., 53 F. (2d) 133, (S. D.
N. Y. 1931).
While In re Feuer, supra, said that "parties in interest" includes "any credi-
tor" no case has been found where a creditor with a non-provable claim has
been held to be included in "parties in interest" entitled to oppose a discharge
under § 14 or to have a composition set aside under § 13. But see In ro
Tebbetts, supra.
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the debtor. This is apparent in Meyers v. 1Iternational Trust CoY
In that case there was a composition between a bankrupt partnership
and the partnership creditors only and in respect only of partnership
debts. After confirmation of the composition, suit was brought
against the partners individually as endorsers of partnership notes.
It was held that the composition did not discharge the partners as
individuals from their separate obligations as endorsers. The action
was brought in the state court. The Supreme Court permitted the
suit without question. That suit did not affect or disturb in any
way the bargain expressed in the composition.3 By the same token
plaintiff's action in the Tramley case to reach the interest of the
stockholder would in nowise affect or override the composition there
made. Hence a proceeding under Section 13 of the Bankruptcy Act
to set aside the composition would be clearly unnecessary. In fact,
as indicated above, it is by no means clear that the bankruptcy court
would have jurisdiction, under the composition sections, to entertain
plaintiff's complaint of being excluded. In any event, until it is held
that the bankruptcy court has such jurisdiction, creditors in the
class of plaintiff might well be accorded the protection to which they
are entitled in any court where personal jurisdiction over defendant
can be obtained. In this respect the argument for sustaining such
an alleged "collateral attack" is much stronger than that which
existed for sustaining the attack in the Boyd case. In the Boyd
case the federal court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin had
jurisdiction over the sale.95 It had the power to require a fair offer
to Boyd. Yet the Supreme Court did not compel Boyd to apply
to that court for permission to attack the reorganization or to at-
tack it in that court. Boyd brought his action in the Eastern
93. 273 U. S. 380 (1927). Cf. Farley & Co. v. Stoll, 250 Mich. 495, 231
N. W. '71 (1930).
94. The nature of a composition is well described in the Mcyers case, at
383: " . . . a composition is 'a settlement of the bankrupt with his creditors'
-in a measure superseding and outside of the bankruptcy proceedings-which
originates in a voluntary offer by the bankrupt and results, in the main, from
voluntary acceptance by his creditors; that the respective rights of the banh-
rupt and the creditors are fixed by the terms of the offer; and that upon the
confirmation of the composition they get what they 'bargained for,' and no
more."
By the same reasoning the "bargain" in the Traamlcy case would in no way
affect the plaintiff, and his pursuit of the old stockholder's interest would in
no way affect the composition, any more than would a composition between
creditors and a corporation necessarily affect the rights of the creditors against
the stockholders for watered stock. In re Berler Shoe Co.. Inc.. 246 Fed. 1018
(S. D. N. Y. 1917).
95. 228 U. S., at 487.
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District of Washington. 96  And there is no doubt that such action
would have lain in any court where Boyd could have obtained juris-
diction of the defendants. Such suit being allowed in the Boyd case,
a fortiori it should be allowed in such a case as the Tramley case.
A totally different result would, of course, follow if Congress had
extended the composition sections to include creditors of the class
of plaintiff in the Tramley case. But Congress has not. Hence the
Tramley case cannot be sustained on any of the grounds on which it
was placed, except that relating to the measure of recovery.07 To
be consistent with other cases in the law of compositions and re-
organization the court should have reversed with directions to
establish a lien on the old stockholder's equity in the pledged common
stock.
There is another line of reasoning which reaches the same result.
The great majority of bankruptcy cases holding that the landlord
had no provable claim involved individual or partnership lessees.
To rank the landlord as the holder of a non-provable claim in these
cases is not to cut him off completely, for, as noted, he may pursue
the lessee even after discharge. But when a corporate lessee is being
wound up and dissolved in receivership or is using bankruptcy as
a stage in the dissolution process, quite different considerations
prevail. To bar the landlord then is to bar him forever, unless, of
course, the lessee is being reorganized. Consequently in the few
cases which have arisen in which the point has been argued, there
has been a decided tendency in the direction of eliminating the
technical barriets against provability and of allowing the claim,
though it falls short of satisfying the ordinary standards of
provability.
96. 170 Fed. 779 (E. D. Wash. 1909).
97. One other point should be noted, though it was not mentioned by the
Court of Appeals. It might have been argued that the proper party defendant
was the stockholder not the corporation. In cases like the Boyd case where
there are many stockholders the simple direct remedy is against the assets
of the new company. In case of a one-man corporation it might be thought
that the remedy should be against the stockholder individually in which action
his interest in the company would be reached. It should be noted, however,
that normally there would be no personal liability of the stockholder. Of.
In re Alamac Operating Corp., 42 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). The
action is in rem. But the same result could be reached as in the Boyd case
by impounding the common stock allocated to the old stockholder subject of
course to the lien of the creditors under the composition. This variation In
procedure hardly seems important. Whether the action is brought against
the corporation or the stockholder the lien established by the judgment would
reach the common stock. See also Frank, supra note 82.
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In Kalkhoff v. Nelsons the stockholders petitioned for a disso-
lution under a state dissolution statute. Dissolution was allowed and
a receiver was appointed. The corporation at the time was in-
solvent. Prior to dissolution the corporation had entered into a
ten year lease with appellants calling for monthly rentals. At the
time of the appointment of the receiver the lease had about seven
years to run. The receiver declined to accept the benefits of the
lease and abandoned it as an asset of the corporation. The ap-
pellants apparently did not accept the offer to surrender and
accordingly filed a claim for damages sustained by reason of the
breach of the covenant of the lessee to pay rent at the stipulated
rate for the full term. The claims were disallowed. An order
denying appellants' motion for a new trial was reversed by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota. The court applied the rule of antici-
patory breach applicable to contracts involving personalty.Y2 In
adverting to cases under its insolvency statute, it stated that those
lessees "continued liable for rent notwithstanding the insolvency
proceedings" but went on to say that,
" ... in the case at bar the corporation has, by its voluntary disso-
lution, practically committed suicide, and when its estate is administered
it ceases to exist. Therefore, if the corporation cannot be held liable for
a total breach of its executory contracts, the law has armed it, and all
other domestic corporations, with the power to repudiate all the obliga-
tions of their executory contracts, by simply instituting proceedings by
its stockholders for a voluntary dissolution." 100
The court added that
"... all discussions of what claims may or may not be proved against
the estate of an insolvent under bankrupt and insolvency laws, and all de-
cisions of courts in cases arising under such laws, are not relevant to
this case.101 The construction of this statute must be the same whether
the corporation is solvent or insolvent, and any construction which would
permit the distribution of the assets of a solvent corporation to its stock-
holders without full payment of all its legal liabilities including damages
98. 60 Minn. 284, 62 N. W. 332 (1895).
99. Laybourn v. Seymour, 53 Minn. 105, 54 N. W. 941 (1893); Bowe v.
Minnesota Milk Co., 44 Minn. 460, 47 N. W. 151 (1890).
100. 60 Minn. at 288, 62 N. W. at 333.
101. See e. g. Wilder v. Peabody, 37 Minn. 248, 33 N. W. 852 (1887), dis-
allowing claim for future rent against assignee under state insolvency statute.
The court distinguishes this case (1) on the ground that the claim was for
rent, not damages for total breach; (2) because the lessees were individuals
who had not incapacitated themselves from ever performing the obligations of
the lease.
1933] 1037
for breaches of its executory contracts, must be rejected, unless its words
and manifest meaning forbid it." 102
The other case is In re Mulings Clothing Co.,10 3 decided by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Shortly before
the commencement of a five year renewal lease, the stockholders of
the corporate lessee voted to wind up its affairs. Accordingly, a
petition was filed in the state court in Connecticut asking for the
4ppointment of a receiver under the statutes and praying for a
dissolution and winding up. The receiver was appointed. He
repudiated the lease. The lease gave the lessor the right to recover
possession through summary process on specified default in rent.
After repudiation of the lease by the receiver the corporate lessee
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated. The
trustee in bankruptcy also repudiated the lease. The lessor then
relet the premises for the balance of the term at a reduced rental and
sought to prove in bankruptcy for the amount of the deficiency.
The order dismissing the petition for liquidation of the claim was
reversed. The court stated that though the dissolution of a cor-
por~tion does not terminate a lease,10 4 nevertheless
'In voting to wind up, and in taking steps to dissolve and securing
the appointment of a receiver in the state court for that purpose, the
corporation lessee renounced the lease and at the same time disabled itself
from performing it. . . .And the law is well settled that, where a party
to an executory contract105 puts it out of his own power to perform it,
there is an anticipatory breach, which gives the other party an immediate
right of action for damages."' 0 6
The plaintiff-lessor therefore had such right of action. The court
added that "If that were not true, he would be remediless; the
corporation being insolvent and determined to cease business and
go out of existence." 107
102. 60 Minn. at 290, 62 N. W. at 334.
103. 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
104. People v. National Trust Co., 82 N. Y. 283 (1880); Cummington Realty
Associates v. Whitten, 239 Mass. 313, 132 N. E. 53 (1921). Contra: Hastings
Corp. v. Letton [1908] 1 K. B, 378 under the Companies Act of 1862. Sco
cases Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 532. As to the effect of death of an individual
lessee, see Note (1930) 68 A. L. R. 590.
105. In a subsequent case, In re Barnett, 12 F. (2d) 73 (C. 0. A. 2d, 1926)
the same court said respecting the Mullins case, "We do not regard it as
having decided that a lease is an ordinary bilateral contract." The question
involved in the Barnett case was whether or not the covenants in V lease for
payment of rent were independent or dependent. And see In ro Wiso Shoes,
Inc., supra note 10; In re Marshall's Garage, Inc., 63 F. (2d) 759 (a. C. A.
2d, 1933).
106. 238 Fed. at 63.
107. Id., at 64.
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The claim was held provable in bankruptcy since it matured on
repudiation by the state receiver and hence was both a claim existing
at the date of the filing of the petition as well as a claim under Section
63 (a) (4). But the important part of the case is the court's
differentiation of this case from its earlier cases holding such claims
not provable. It said:
"It has no analogy to a case of ordinary bankruptcy of an insolvent
tenant. The filing of the petition in bankruptcy in such a case does not
terminate the relation of landlord and tenant, but the tenant remains
liable for the future rent as it accrues. It does not end the capacity of
the tenant to engage in future business and to acquire other assets which
can be reached by the lessee in subsequent proceedings for the payment
of the rent which subsequently accrues. It does not involve an abandon-
ment of the lease, and does not disable the tenant from afterwards per-
forming its covenants." 08
Here, then, are two cases-one in receivership and one in bank-
ruptcy-applying a different rule on provability of landlords' claims
when dissolution of the corporate lessee has been effected or in
process. 0 9 The fact that these courts admit the proof in this type
of case and not in the ordinary case of individuals, partners or
corporations not in process of dissolution indicates once more the
implied assumption in the latter cases that no great hardship is
being done the landlord. For in the latter type of case the landlord
108. Id., at 68.
109. There are supporting authorities. Thus in People v. National Trust
Co., supra note 104, before the end of the term a receiver was appointed for
the corporate lessee on application of stockholders and the attorney general
commenced an action for the forfeiture of the franchise and dissolution. A
decree of dissolution was entered. The receiver refused to pay subsequently
accruing rent. But he had in his possession more than enough funds to pay
all creditors including rent to the landlord for the balance of the term. The
landlord petitioned for an order directing the receiver to pay the rent then
due. The orders denying the petition were reversed. The court denied the
contention that dissolution terminated the lease. It said, at 287: "Under the
statutes of this State, on the dissolution of a corporation, its assets become a
trust fund for the payment of its debts, and these include debts to mature
as well as accrued indebtedness, and all engagements entered into by the cor-
poration, which have not been fully satisfied or cancelled. These cannot be
cancelled without the consent of the party holding them, and receivers of
dissolved corporations are authorized to retain out of their assets a sufficient
amount to cancel and discharge such, open and subsisting engagements." On
the basis of this dictum the same result would follow in New York: as in the
case of Kalkhoff v. Nelson, supra note 98. The rule of the latter case was
applied in Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 74 Minn. 98, 76 N. W. 1024
(1898) where a statutory receiver had been appointed for a bank on petition
of creditors.
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has his claim against the discharged or rehabilitated person or cor-
poration after bankruptcy or receivership is terminated.
In but few cases has this analysis received either favorable or
unfavorable consideration. Fidelity Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Armstrong,"° decided by a federal circuit court in Ohio in 1888,
is one case taking a contrary position. The corporate lessee was a
national bank taken over by the comptroller of the currency under
the national banking act. A receiver was appointed and the charter
of the bank was forfeited. The claim of the landlord was disallowed.
The type of argument used in Kalkhoff v. Nelson and In re Mullings
Clothing Co. was apparently presented to this court. The court's
answer was that the statute permitting a forfeiture of the charter
was in force at the time the lease was made and that these con-
tingencies should have been taken into account by the lessor when
he made his contract and "if not satisfied to rely upon the bank itself,
the only other course would have been to insist upon security for the
performance of the conditions of the lease." I" It is not clear from
the case whether the claim was for future rent or for damages.
Apparently it was for rent. But rent reserved would not be the
measure of recovery on anticipatory breach any more than would the
price under an ordinary sales contract."2  Hence the case may be
distinguished on that ground. If the reason for the decision is that
there can be no anticipatory breach of a lease the case is, of course,
not without support. Yet on its facts it lays down a rule much less
persuasive than the two later cases opposed to it. Certainly it
should make no difference that in this case the dissolution was caused
by the intervention of the comptroller of the currency while in
Kalkhoff v. Nelson and In re Mullings Clothing Co. the dissolution
was effected through the initiative of the corporations and their
stockholders. The Supreme Court has made no such distinction in
treating bankruptcy as an anticipatory breach; the rule of the
Chicago Auditorium case 113 is applicable to involuntary as well as
voluntary bankruptcies.
In the foregoing cases there was no corporate reorganization
contemplated. The effect of a reorganization, however, would be
exactly the same under present procedures. The old corporation
would be dissolved and the assets acquired by another. To leave
the landlord with a claim against a propertyless entity would in
110. 35 Fed. 567 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1888). Cf. In re Wise Shoes, Inc., supra
note 10; Pacific States Corp. v. Rosenshine, 113 Cal. App. 266, 298 Pac. 155
(1931); Towle v. Commissioner of Banks, 246 Mass. 161, 140 N. E. 747 (1923).
111. 35 Fed. at 569.
112. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1329.
113. Note 5, supra.
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effect be to accomplish the very thing that the Boyd case and its 13
ELIZABETH background vitiate.
The Kalkhoff case and In re Mdlins lead by different roads to
the same result as the Howard case. They alter the rule of prova-
bility and make the landlord's claim matured, though perhaps un-
liquidated, in the event of corporate dissolution. The Howard case
admits its non-provability but grants it protection against the
appropriation by stockholders of the assets of the debtor. Courts
need not extend the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to leases
in order to give the landlord participation in a reorganization plan
which allows participation by the old stockholders in the new com-
pany. Adoption of the rule of anticipatory repudiation merely aids
in the problem of valuation of the landlord's claim for purposes of
participation in the plan. It is no sine qua non for protection under
the Boyd case.
III.
The difficult problem of valuation of the landlord's claim remains.
That issue was not involved in the Howard case because of a stipu-
lation as to damages. And, of course, if the landlord is not offered
participation in the plan no peculiar or unique question as to valu-
ation need arise. He can mature his claim in the ordinary and
usual way and sue the new company when his judgment is obtained.
That might be one year or twenty years after the reorganization.
As long as he moves promptly after his claim matures, he would not
be barred by laches any more than was Boyd. But since the rules
of the Boyd case give the landlord protection, reorganization managers
will be confronted with the difficult problem of valuing the claim
to determine what cash provision should be made or what other
participation under the plan should be reserved for him. In gen-
eral two types of situations will arise: (1) In case of a reorgani-
zation of a guarantor (the lessee remaining a going concern) it
would be wholly uncertain at all stages of the reorganization whether
or not the guarantor would ever be liable, or if liable, what the
extent of the liability would be; (2) In case of a reorganization of
the lessee whether in bankruptcy or receivership, the lease normally
would be adopted or disaffirmed within a reasonable time 114 after
the initiation of the proceedings.
In the first place if the lease, or, in case of a reorganization of the
guarantor, the guaranty, is adopted it would normally be assumed
by the new corporation. That obviously would be protection and
114. See cases cited note 61, supra.
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participation of the lessor sufficient to satisfy all requirements of
the Boyd case.
If the guaranty is not assumed, then we have substantially the
situation in the Howard case. In that case counsel urged that
"difficulties will arise in working out the plans of beneficial re-
organizations" if landlords must be provided for in reorganization
plans. But Judge Mayer replied that "Equity usually succeeds in
molding its decrees to the requirements of the situation with which
it deals, and finds a way to practical as well as just results." 115 With
that point of view it is not difficult to devise a procedure consistent
with the requirements of the Howard case. These requirements
are to make a fair and equitable offer to the landlord in the reor-
ganization of the guarantor. Clearly he is not entitled immediately
to receipt of cash or securities. He may never be entitled to them,
since the lessee may never default. It is known, however, what
the maximum amount of the liability of the guarantor will be
from the date of the consummation of the plan to the end of
the lease. It may be less; it will never be more. Precision in
estimating it is impossible since no cause of action has matured.
The maximum amount can be taken as if it were a presently liquidated
sum. Cash or securities can be reserved for the maximum amount
of that claim. And the court should have the power to force the
landlord to elect which of those alternatives he will choose. Having
chosen, he is forever bound. No cash or securities will be delivered
to him immediately but they will be impounded for his benefit. As,
if and when his claim matures he must liquidate it. Once liquidated
the amount of his participation will be finally determined. If the
claim is less than the estimated maximum, the participation will
be reduced proportionately.
It may be argued that such method hopelessly delays the whole
reorganization and holds in abeyance for an almost interminable
period the final distribution of cash or securities. In case of long
term leases guaranteed by the defendant this might be true. From
the viewpoint of the new company, however, it is a choice of equally
undesirable alternatives. In case no provision is made for the
landlord, he may later sue the new company. How much his re-
covery will be, if any, or when he may sue is also uncertain.
Reorganization managers may choose the latter alternative as the
preferable one. In either event the ascertainment of the ultimate
liability will be held in abeyance. Consequently there seems to be
nothing particularly undesirable in giving the landlord contingent
protection under the plan. To allow the court to have that power
115. 269 Fed. at 306.
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certainly prevents the landlord from later obtaining an undue pre-
ference over other creditors. Viewed from the position of the re-
organization managers, much the same difficulty was present in
the Boyd case. At the date of the sale, which occurred in 1896, it
was still uncertain what the amount of the claim against the Coeur
D'Alene would be. The Supreme Court of Idaho did not finally
decide the question until 1897.110 When decided it was by no means
certain what the liability, if any, of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company would be. If it was not liable, no provision at all need be
made for Boyd. In requiring reorganization managers to provide for
creditors like Boyd, the Supreme Court forces the adoption of an
administrative rule which will afford protection to "as, if, and when"
creditors. The requirement of the Howard case is hardly more
exacting.
The claim of the landlord (or in case of payment under the
guaranty, the claim of the guarantor) in the reorganization of
the lessee raises problems equally unsettled. The liability of the
lessee to the landlord may be governed: (1) by no express
covenant in the lease; (2) by an express covenant in the lease
which stipulates how the damages are to be measured but not
when they are to be paid; (3) by an express covenant stipulating
not only the measure of damages but also the time of their payment.
For purposes of convenience (1) and (2) may be treated together.
In those jurisdictions 117 which permit an action for damages for
anticipatory repudiation of a lease the measure of damages is
normally taken to be the difference between rent reserved and the
fair rental value of the premises for the balance of the term.118 The
jury is allowed to estimate that sum. The degree of guesswork in-
volved obviously increases as the length of the balance of the term
becomes greater. But the elements of speculation and guesswork
are no barriers to an assessment. As stated by one court:
116. Note 46, supra.
117. Wilson v. National Refining Co., supra note 7; Grayson v. Mixon, 176
Ark. 1123, 5 S. W. (2d) 312 (1928); Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 At!.
432 (Del. 1931); Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 57 F. (2d) 340 (E. D. Mich. 1932);
Womble v. Leigh, 195 N. C. 282, 142 S. E. 17 (1928) ; In re Reading Iron Works,
150 Pa. 369, 24 Atl. 617 (1892). And see Note (1927) 6 N. C. L. Rev. 68;
Note, Id. 495 (1928); Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 84 N. H. 93, 146 AtI.
525 (1929); Weir v. Cooper, 122 Miss. 225, 84 So. 184 (1920).
118. Grayson v. Mixon, supra note 117; Wilson v. National Refining Co.,
supra note 7. In case of a reletting for the balance of the term the claim
would be for the deficiency. In re Mullins Clothing Co., supra note 103; Curran
v. Smith-Zollinger Co., supra note 117. On burden of proving fair rental
value cf. Leo v. Pearce Stores Co. and Womble v. Leigh, both supra note 117.
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"It is true, the damages are unliquidated, and that it cannot be shown
with absolute certainty that the appellants, except for the breach of the
contract by the corporation, would have completely executed the contract
on their part, so as to become entitled to its full benefits; but the same
difficulties are presented in a greater or less degree in all actions for
the recovery of damages for the breach of executory contracts. Any
difficulties, real or supposed, in ascertaining the damages in this case,
cannot defeat the action." 119
And analogies can be supplied on end.120 In jurisdictions having the
rule of anticipatory repudiation the claim would be liquidated and
the participation under the plan determined accordingly.
Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted a different rule both
in cases where there is no express covenant and in cases where the
covenant is silent as to the time when damages are recoverable. One
leading case is Hermitage Co. v. Levine. 2 1 In that case the lessor
re-entered and relet the premises pursuant to a covenant providing
that "the tenant shall remain liable for all damages which the land-
lord may sustain by any such breach of this agreement, or through
such entry or reletting." The new leases were for terms substantially
less than the balance of the term of the defendant. The lessee was
not being liquidated or reorganized. The action was for damages
suffered by the landlord through deficiency of rents computed to the
date of commencement of the action. The Court of Appeals reversed
119. Kalkhoff v. Nelson, supra note 98, at 288. And see Leo v. Pearce Stores
Co., supra note 117.
120. Thus in an action for damages for breach of a contract to lease realty
damages may be recovered at once. Branning Mfg. Co. v. Norfolk Southern
RR. Co., 138 Va. 43, 121 S. E. 74 (1924) ; Bondy v. Harvey, 218 App. Div. 126,
217 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1st Dept. 1926); Oldfield v. Angeles Brewing & Malting
Co., 62 Wash. 260, 113 Pac. 630 (1911); Addieg v. Tull, 187 Fed. 101 (C. C. A.
2d, 1911). In Bondy v. Harvey, supra, the agreement was for a 99 year lease.
As to the measure of damages the court said, at 126, 217 N. Y. Supp. at 873:
"The court charged the jury that it could fix the present value of the lease
by multiplying the difference between the rent reserved and the rental value
by ninety-nine, the number of years that the lease had to run. While this is
the rule applied in valuing short term leases where the present value of the
payment is not in serious issue, this rule cannot be applied to an assessment
of damages which results from a breach of a contract to lease where the pay-
ment or benefit from the payment would not accrue at the longest term under
the lease for ninety-nine years. It is obviously the correct rule that such
damage as the plaintiff suffered by reason of not securing the lease and losing
the benefit of the difference between its value and the rent reserved, is the
present value of such sum arrived at by making such proper abatement as
would give the present value of such difference for the period specified in the
lease."
121. 248 N. Y. 333, 162 N. E. 97 (1928).
1044 [Vol. 42
a judgment of the Appellate Division for plaintiff and affirmed a
judgment of the Trial Term dismissing the complaint. Chief Judge
Cardozo said:
" .. . in the absence of a provision that points with reasonable clear-
ness to a different construction, a liability for damages resulting from
a reletting is single and entire, not multiple and several. The deficiency
is to be ascertained when the term is at an end .... The tenant when
ejected ceases to be a tenant. What he covenants to pay is the damage,
not the rent. To hold him for monthly deficits is to charge him with
the obligations of a tenant without any of the privileges. He must pay
in the lean months, without recouping in the fat ones. He must do this,
though it may turn out in the end that there has been a gain and not
a loss. A liability so heavy may not rest upon uncertain inference.
"We do not overlook the hardship to the landlord in postponing the
cause of action until October, 1945. The hardship is so great as to give
force to the argument that postponement to a date so distant may not
reasonably be held to have been intended by the parties. There is no
reason to suppose, however, that the landlord was expectant of so early
a default or so heavy a deficiency. It had in its possession a deposit
of cash security in the sum of $30,000. Very likely this was supposed
to be enough to make default improbable and the risk of loss remote. If
the damage clause as drawn gives inadequate protection, the fault is with
the draftsman. The courts are not at liberty to supply its omissions at
the expense of a tenant whose liability for the future ended with the
cancellation of the lease except in so far as he bound himself by covenant
to liability thereafter." 122
On the basis of this decision no action can be brought until the
end of the term. If the Hermitage case is to be followed in reorgani-
zations so as to make it impossible to liquidate the claim presently,
the difficulties of providing for the landlord in the reorganization
plan will be as acute here as in the case of the guarantor discussed
above. The Hermitage case has some support.- 3 Other jurisdictions
adhering to the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation would hold other-
wise'12 4 and permit immediate liquidation. But the cases establishing
the rule laid down in the Hernmtage case did not have their origin
in reorganizations. In any event the reorganization court should
122. Id. at 338-39, 162 N. E. at 100, 101. Cf. Mann v. Munch Brewery,
225 N. Y. 189, 121 N. E. 746 (1919).
123. Providence Building Co. v. Atlantic National Bank, 228 Fed. 814 (D.
R. I. 1916); Woodbury v. Sparrell Print, supra note 54; Phillips-Hollman v.
Peerless Stages, 210 Cal. 253, 291 Pac. 178 (1930); Treff v. Gulko, 297 Pac.
978 (Cal. App. 1931), aff'd, 214 Cal. 591, 7 P. (2d) 697 (1932).
124. In addition to the cases smpra note 117, see Stott Realty Co. v. United
Amusement Co., 195 Mich. 684, 162 N. W. 283 (1917). Cf. John Church Co.
v. Martinez, 204 S. W. 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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not permit them to stand in the way of an expeditious and early
adjudication of the claim of the landlord, To delay the ultimate
distribution of the securities or the cash under the plan in order to
satisfy the technical requirements of the Hermitage case is undesir-
able. Insofar as possible, administrative rules in this connection
should be devised to accelerate the consummation of the plan. As
Swaine has said, "receiverships are always expensive luxuries." 12-
The chancellor should shape the decrees to meet the exigencies of
the situation. The claim could be referred to a master for liquidation
and adjudicated once and for all. It is far more sensible to liquidate
it presently in a manner "familiar and fair" than to let it survive the
reorganization and be imposed on the new company at a distant date,
as it could be under the rule of the Howard case. We are here passing
on unanswered legal questions. The urge is for an administrative
rule that will determine with finality the rights of all parties. In
terms of effective reorganizations this pragmatism has strong appeal.
To requote Judge Mayer, "Equity usually . . . finds a way to
practical as well as just results." 126 In a court of equity the pro-
cedure recommended should find ready adoption.
Reference has been made above to claims of the landlord for rent
maturing after a disaffirmance by the trustee or receiver of the lessee.
It is doubtful if proof of all future rent under an acceleration clause
would be allowed in bankruptcy or receivership. It would violate
the spirit of the bankruptcy act and of receivership. Though there
is not much authority, what there is indicates that the landlord's
claim would not be evaluated at his option in terms of future rent.127
125. Swaine, supra note 34, at 921.
126. 269 Fed. at 306.
127. Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224 (1030). And see Ml einnon
v. Cohen, 7 Alb. L. Rep. 317 (1914) arising under the Assignment Act of
1907. For other cases see Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 300, 302, 314. But seo
Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919). It should be noted that
in the Kothe case the only event accelerating the due date of the rent was
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. If other events as well would accelerate
the rent and the breach of any of them would cause losses uncertain and not
out of all proportion to the amount of accelerated rent [Kemble v. Farren,
6 Bing. 141 (K. B. 1829)], it might be argued that such provision was valid
even in bankruptcy. At least it would be less apparent that the "real design"
was to insure to the lessor preferential treatment in the event of bankruptcy
as in the Kotke case. If, however, a broader view of liquidated damages were
taken and so far as bankruptcy or receivership is concerned the test of intent
discarded, the same result as in the Kotlie case would be reached, To allow
such claims Would in some cases practically amount to exclusion of otlier credi-
tors. Furthermore, it would thrust the lease upon the receiver or trtuteo
Willy-nilly with no' power to refuse to adopt it, with the necessity perhaps of
liquidating it on a reletting over a long period of years. This would follow
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He would be entitled to his leasehold and his damages and nothing
more.
In case the landlord chooses to stand on his lease and collect future
rent as it matures-a right he clearly possesses apart from reorgani-
zation 128 the reorganization court should have power to deal with
him effectively. To put it beyond the power of a court of equity to
make him a fair offer under the plan and hence bar him forever is
highly undesirable. Two procedures are possible. The first is to
provide for his participation as the rent becomes due during the
balance of the term by setting aside securities deliverable on rent
days; the second is to liquidate at once his claim for damages and
to give him present participation to the full amount of his claim.
The first is out of the question. It delays the reorganization and
thrusts the lease upon the new company even against the better
judgment of the reorganization managers and the court. The second
is clearly the only practicable alternative. "Fair offer" under the
Boyd case permits of discretion on the part of the court. It by no
means requires the court to follow all the niceties of technical rules
of law developed in other situations. Accordingly the equity court
has the power to protect the new company against renewed and
continuing demands of the landlord in his claim for rent as it
matures, by giving him an offer that is "fair" when judged in light
of the exigencies of the situation. That calls for liquidation of his
claim in terms of damages, not rent, in all cases where the new
company does not adopt the lease.
Other rules of law have arisen respecting the valuation of the
landlord's claim but which have no appropriate place in reorgani-
zations. Thus, it has been held that in absence of a reletting for
the balance of the term "" or, in lieu of that, a showing that a
reasonable effort has been made but without success, c0 the claim is
since a landlord could not have his land and rent it too. The adoption of the
rule of the Kothe case in all bankruptcy and receivership cases no matter
how the covenant is worded or conditioned makes for more equitable treatment
of all creditors and avoids the likelihood of giving the landlord a preferred
position (in fact though not in law).
128. See cases supra note 60.
129. For cases permitting proof in receivership where there has been a
reletting for the balance of the term, see People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 151 N. Y.
592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897) [especially the opinion below 3 App. Div. 544, 547,
38 N. Y. Supp. 379, 381 (1st Dept. 1896)]; McGraw v. Union Trust Co., 135
Mich. 609, 98 N. W. 390 (1904). The same result is reached under a general
assignment. Smith v. Goodman, 149 Ill. 75, 36 N. E. 621 (1893).
130. In such event the claim has been held non-provable in receivership.
International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U. S. 364 (1906). Contra: where he has
made an honest and reasonable but unsuccessful attempt to relet. Woodland
v. Wise, 112 Md. 35, 76 Atl. 502 (1910).
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not provable in receivership nor is it maintainable against the lessee
apart from receivership or bankruptcy. How far reorganization
courts will go in applying that rule is undecided. But here as in the
other situations discussed above the call is for a direct and simple
method of liquidation, so as to adjudicate once and for all the rights
of the parties and to permit the new company insofar as possible
to begin business with a clean slate. The reorganization procedure
may afford ample time for the lessor to make reasonable efforts to
relet for the balance of the term. Or again it may not. Or he may
be able to relet for only a part of the balance. The procedure to
be adopted should be moulded to the requirements of the case. No
technical rule of law should stand in the way of the chancellor
effecting substantial justice for all and taking such short cuts
as are desirable in avoidance of rules which make impossible a
timely readjustment of the claims of all creditors.
This requirement is forcibly demonstrated in the third group of
cases listed above. Frequently covenants specify that the damages
are to be computed and paid monthly, or at other stated periods.
If those covenants are enforced literally, as they normally would
be,131 the landlord under the Howard case would be in a position to
pursue the new company for the deficiencies month after month
over a period of years. Those rules, developed out of other situations,
certainly have no place in reorganization procedure. The demand
here as in the other cases is to devise an administrative procedure
which will bring as large a degree of finality as possible into liquida-
tion of claims for participation in plans. The equity of the situation
clearly calls for that protection to landlords which is afforded by the
Howard case. It also calls as clearly for a formulation of a pro-
cedure which will give no undue advantage to the landlord and
produce no long delays in consummation of the plan.
The alternative to overriding the technical requirements of the
Hermitage case would be to provide a contingent participation for
the landlord as in the case of the guarantor. The disadvantages of
that are so apparent as to need no further mention. They should be
avoided where possible. They can hardly be avoided in many cases
of guarantors because of the insuperable difficulty of determining in-
telligently whether or not the lessee will ever default. Once a default
is made, however, the difficulty is present but not so great. The value
of the leasehold is much more readily and objectively determinable in
131. McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902); Under-
hill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576 (1892); Jones v. Rushmore, 67
N. J. L. 157, 50 Atl. 587 (1901); Miller v. Benton, 55 Conn. 529, 13 Atl. 678(1887); Kottler v. New York Bargain House, Inc., 242 N. Y. 28, 150 N. E. 591
(1926).
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such a case than is the claim of the landlord against the guarantor
in case the lessee at some unknown and undeterminable future time
defaults.
IV.
As stated above there has been considerable condemnation of the
employment by lessees of bankruptcy and receivership to avoid leases,
and a growing insistence where that was the dominant motive that
adjudication in bankruptcy and appointment of receivers should be
at least zealously guarded or even denied. If the state of the law
permitted the lessee to rid itself of the landlord so easily and to
reorganize under the protection of the court without regard to claims
of the landlord, the insistence upon guarded uses of legal methods
to accomplish that result would be justified. The need for reduction
of fixed charges, however, is so insistent and the desirability of
financial rehabilitation is so great that the problem from the view-
point of the law is not to make it difficult to reorganize but to guar-
antee that reorganizations be conducted fairly and equitably. The
scrutiny of courts should be most severe at the stage where the
reorganization plan is being formulated. At that juncture should
landlords receive their protection. And a recognition of the ap-
plicability of the Boyd case to this situation will give landlords
everything to which they are entitled. They are not entitled to
the preferred position which they would have if, regardless of thejudicial sale or composition, they could sue the new company; nor
can their exclusion from the plan be justified on any legal or busi-
ness grounds.
Landlords are as much in business with their tenants as any other
creditors.132 In reorganizations they should be accorded the same
treatment as any other creditor. The feudal aspects of their legal
rights and duties should not obscure the dominant business and
economic characteristics of their position.133 As frequently as not
they are in as precarious financial position as their tenants, having
equally unbearable burdens of overhead. In fact, in innumerable
instances the so-called landlord is none other than a group of bond-
holders who have financed the building. It is the interest of those
bondholders that is ultimately at stake; and pitted against that
interest is the interest of the lessee which in turn represents the
investments of other creditors, bondholders and stockholders. The
problem becomes, then, one of wholesale reorganization with dis-
132. More so, in fact, under the forms of percentage leases used somewhat
in the past and now apparently more in vogue. See N. Y. World-Telegram,
December 16, 1932, at 36.
133. See note 6, supra.
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crimination against no type of creditor. The process of effective
financial rehabilitation can best be furthered by a recognition of
the applicability of the Boyd case to this situation and by the
development of expeditious administrative procedures which will
facilitate the liquidation of claims. There can be no doubt that
the general equity powers are sufficiently flexible to meet the re-
quirements of the situation.
